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NOTES
INTER Vivos TRUSTS AND THE DOCTRINE OF WORTIER TITLE*
THE common law doctrine of worthier title precludes a transferor from
constituting his right heir a purchaser; a conveyance or devise in violation
of this rule is considered a nullity, and the property passes by descent.1 Feudal
in origin and purpose, the dogma still persists in the United States, although
the practical considerations which were responsible for its development long
since have ceased to exist. Rigid application has not infrequently been at
the expense of the obvious intent of grantor or testator." Sacrificing symmetry
and certainty of decision, the New York Court of Appeals in Doctor v.
Hughes3 reduced this pristine rule of property to a rule of construction by
which conveyances and devises to heirs are deemed reversions "unless a
contrary intent appears". Although in this fashion a sufficient flexibility might
be thought to have been provided, a recent case suggests that inequitable
decisions will follow the doctrine's continued existence in any form. 4
By a will executed in 1931 the late Marilyn MKiller bequeathed $45,000 to
several legatees; the residue of her then half-million dollar estate she gave
to her two sisters, subject to a life estate in her mother. Subsequent to her
marriage in 1934, decedent transferred $78,000 in trust under an agreement
by which the trustee was to pay her from principal and interest $500 per
week. Provision was made for termination of the trust and payment to
decedent of $5000 as soon as the weekly payments should have depleted the
corpus to that sum. In the event of her decease prior to that time, the corpus
was to be distributed to decedent's testamentary appointees, or, in default
of appointment, to her distributees under New York Law. The settlor
died less than a year after the creation of the trust. At this time, there were
outstanding creditor claims of $34,000 against the general estate which had
dwindled to $31,000; the trust corpus had been reduced to $64,000. Reversing
both lower courts,i the Court of Appeals applied the worthier title doctrine,
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 278 N. Y. 134, 15 N. F. (2d) 553 (1938).
The LAW JOURNAL is indebted to Carlota Garfias of the Second Year Class for assistauce
in the preparation of this note.
. 1. Co. Liut. ** 22b, 87b; 2 TIFAxY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 4 487; Pibus v.
Mitford, 1 Vent. 372 (K. B. 1674). The doctrine, which has been abolished by statute in
England [3 & 4 NVm. IV, c. 106. § 3 (1833)], has occasionally been ignored in this coun-
try [(1934) 20 CORN. L. Q. 117, n. 10; (1933) 46 HARv. L. REV. 1000, n. 601; the UNi-
Flo-m LAW OF PROPERTY Acr (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1937) puts an end to the doctrine.
§ § 28, 29.
2. See, generally, Harper and Heckel, The Doctrine of 11orthier Title (1930) 24
ILL. L. REV. 627; Bordwell, Alienability and Pcrpctitlies 11 (1937) 23 IoWA L, Ruv. 1;
Comments (1933) 46 HARy. L. REV. 993, (1934) 20 CORN. L. Q. 116.
3. 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 22-1 (1919), (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 713.
4. But see note 35, infra.
5. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 163 Misc. 459, 297 N. Y. Supp. 88 (Sup.
Ct. 1937), aff'd without opinion, 253 App. Div. 707, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 640 (1st Dep't 1937).
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so that the trust corpus reverted to decedent's estate and fell subject to the
claims of creditors and the husband's statutory share.,
It is not impossible for a testamentary power of appointment to be exer-
cised by a will executed before the instrument creating the power.T Con.e-
quently, the first question to be resolved was whether or not the remainder
in the trust corpus had been appointed by the prior will. The husband had
argued that the power was exercised, if at all, by the entire will, so that the
trust res merged with the general estate and under the rules of abatement
became subject to the husband's statutory share,8 and to claims of general
legatees. Under his suggested interpretation creditors would have consumed
the general estate and 3C00 of the trust corpus," and the remaining $61,000
would have been distributed half to the husband 10 and half to the general
legatees; nothing would have remained for the residuary legatees. But the
lower court denied his claim, and held that the settlisr intended to appoint
the corpus not as part of the general estate but directly to the persons named
in the residuary clause of the will," so that the trust principal was not subject
to the statutory share. 2 By this decision both spouse and general legatees
6. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 278 N. Y. 134, 15 N. E. t2d1 553 (193T1.
7. See 1 SI-YEs. LAW OF IT1RZE IxNERSTs (1936)1 §272. But 4f. Mattesn v. G,,-
dard. 17 R. I. 299, 21 Atl. 914 (1891 requiring clear intent in creative instrument that
power be so exercised).
R. Brief for Appellant. pp. 51 et scq., City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 278
N. Y. 134, 15 N. E. (2d) 553 (1938). The donee's intent is always dvterminativ of
whether the power has been exercised by the will generally or by a residuary gift. e
I Sx.ras. LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) § 270, and cases there cited.
9. Under any interpretation the creditors receive payment in full. If the ger,.'ral
p ,wer of appointment is held to have been exercised, the appointed assets are subject tw
creditor claims to the extent that other available property is insufficient ftor that purl,,e.
Clapp v. Ingraham. 126 Mass. 209 (1879); RE.sT.TEmENT, PP, ,iEtTy t Tent. Draft X".
7. 1937) § 452. Contra: Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Anthony, 49 R. 1. 339, 142
At. 531 (1928). Similarly, if the power is held nut to have been exercied, it is imma-
terial whether the property reverts to the settlor's estate (and as such is subject to crul-
itor claims) or passes to the "remaindermen." For w\here a settlbtr retains a life estate
and a general power to appoint the corpus, both life estate and ct-orpns are generally sub-
ject to claims of existing and subsequent creditors. Menken Co. v. Brinkley, 94 Tenn.
721, 31 S. Vjr. 92 (1895) ; see Griswold. Spendthrift Trusts Created in ll1h04 or il Part
for the Benefit of the Settlor (1930) 44 HARv. L. REv. 2113, 203, n. 1). See also X. Y.
PERs. PROP. LAW § 34 and N. Y. REAL PREJP. LAW § 152 (w'hich applies to personal pr,,.p-
erty).
10. The husband's statutory share is equal to one-half of the net estate. N. Y. DL-
C.DEN T ESTATE LAw § IR.
11. The court relied upon § IS of the N. Y. PEits. Przor. LAW wVhich provides that,
in the absence of a contrary intent, "property embraced in a puiwer too bequeath, pa-'es
by a will . . . purporting to pass all the . . . property of the testatur." City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 163 Misc. 459, 405, 297 X. Y. Supp. 8, 95 ( Sul. Ct. 1937 ).
12. Property covered by a power of appointment is not included among the as'ets
in which a surviving spouse of the donee is entitled to share. See RESTATE ' .;T. P11,X,-
Ev- (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1937) § 455 (2). But a contrary result would obtain if the trust
were set up to deprive the spouse of his distributive share. Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div.
119, 286 N. Y- Supp. 814 (1st Dep't 1936), (1937) 46 YAix.E L. J. 884; Xewman v. Dore,
275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966 (1937), (1933) 36 Mici. L. REv. 4%.
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would have been cut off. The Court of Appeals, however, did not discuss
the problem of appointment. As a result, it is pure conjecture whether or not
that court felt that the inclusion in the trust agreement of a gift in default
of appointment indicated a lack of intent to make an appointment by all or
part of the prior will. In any event, the purported application of Doctor v.
Hughes'3 necessarily decided that no appointment had been made, for an
appointment would have disposed of the trust corpus and would therefore
have removed any reason for deciding whether a remainder or a reversion
had been created by the gift in default of appointment.
Although in the principal case the settlor failed to reserve a power of
revocation, the Court of Appeals assumed that the trust was revocable at the
sole option of the settlor. Thereby it in effect assumed the point in issue,
i.e., that the doctrine of worthier title was applicable and hence that a rever-
sion had been reserved; for, if a remainder had been involved, revocation
could not have been accomplished without the consent of the remaindermen.14
Not infrequently in New York similar issues have received cursory treat-
ment;15 other cases have set up so-called indicia for determining whether
the grantor "intended" to create a reversion or a remainder. Reservation
of a power to invade, pledge, or assign the corpus has been held to indicate
a reversionary intent ;1G and presumptions have been indulged in to the effect
that the living intend to retain control of their property during life and do
not desire to forego this control by providing for remainders subject only to
divestment by appointment. 17 In the instant case the court apparently resorted
to similar metaphysical formulae to reinforce its conclusion. Mention was
made of the provision for termination of the trust and distribution to the
settlor upon reduction of the corpus to $5000. By this, tacit confirmation
would seem to have been given to several Appellate Division cases which
construed such a provision to indicate that the settlor did not intend to divest
himself of his estate in the trust res.'8 As a further indication of an intent
13. 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919), (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 713.
14. Section 23, N. Y. Peas. PROP. LAW, permits a settlor to revoke when lie obtaiuq
"the written consent of all the persons beneficially interested." See Comment (1937) 46
YALE L. 3. 1005, 1014; Keating, The Revocation of Irrevocable Trusts in New York
(1935) 69 U. S. L. REv. 412.
15. E.g., Davies v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 380, 288 N. Y. Supp,
398 (1st Dep't 1936) (reversion); Hussey v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co,, 230 App,
Div. 117, 258 N. Y. Supp. 396 (lst Dep't 1932) (remainder), aftd, 261 N. Y. 533, 18,5
N. E. 726 (1933).
16. Cagliardi v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 230 App. Div. 192, 243 N. Y. Supp. 573
(1st Dep't 1930); M. Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 162 App. Div. 607, 147 N. Y.
Supp. 1058 (1st Dep't 1914).
17. Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 313, 122 N. E. 221, 223 (1919) ; Cagliardl 'v.
Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 230 App. Div. 192, 194, 243 N. Y. Supp. 573, 576 (1st Dep't
1930). But cf. Schoellkopf v. Marine Trust Co. of Buffalo, 242 App. Div. 11, 14, 272
N. Y. Supp. 613, 616 (4th Dep't 1934), aff'd, 267 N. Y. 358, 196 N. E. 288 (1935).
18. Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 235 App. Div. 170, 256 N. Y. Supp.
563 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 260 N. Y. 539, 184 N. E. 83 (1932) : cf. Aranyi v. Bankers
Trust Co., 201 App. Div. 706, 194 N. Y. Supp. 614 (1st Dep't 1922) ; Cagliardi v. Bank
of N. Y. & Trust Co., 230 App. Div. 192, 243 N. Y. Supp. 573 (1st Dep't 1030). But cf.
Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co. of N. Y., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929).
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to reserve a reversion, the court ascribed the provision for distribution to
the settlor's distributees under New York Law in default of appointment
to a desire not to vary the ordinary manner or line of intestate succession. 10
The court might just as easily have attributed to the settlor an intention
to create a remainder. Where desired, it has been found convenient to discover
intent to create a remainder from the fact that the "remaindermen" were
defined by a statute in force at some other time,-' by a statute of distributions
of another jurisdiction,21 or by a statute not applicable to the type of property
involved. - 22 Here it was merely fortuitous that decedent died a resident of
New York. Similarly, directions that trustees "pay over" to intestate suc-
cessors have been held indicatiVe of an intent to create a remainder in the
successors;2 the language of the instant trust deed was comparable. -t The
inclusion of a testamentary power of appointment in the instant trust might
well have permitted an application of the doctrine that a power of appoint-
ment is inconsistent with a reversion and hence shows an intent to effect
a remainder,25 especially since here the principal trust deed omitted a power
of revocation.2 6  The settlor could so easily have shown an unequivocal
ir:tent to retain a reversion, either by failing to provide for distribution of
19. Since intent is cardinal [Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 X. E. 221
(1919)], it is difficult to comprehend why the instant language should achieve a rever-
sion, whereas a default gift over to some or perhaps all of the settlor's heirs, e.g., to
issue [Crackanthorpe v. Sickles, 156 App. Div. 753, 141 N. Y. Supp. 370 (1st Dcp't
1913)1 or to children [Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Harris, 267 N. Y. 1, 193 N. E. 529
(1935)] or to a named person [McKnight v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 254 X. Y. 417,
173 N. E. 568 (1930)], will result in a remainder.
20. Gray v. Union Trust Co. of San Francisco, 171 Cal. 637, 154 Pac. 305 (1915).
But cf. Robinson v. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co., 75 Misc. 361, 133 X. Y. Supp.
257 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
21. See Davies v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 380, 3,43, 2M8 N. Y.
Supp. 398, 401 (1st Dep't 1936) (dissenting opinion) ; (1929) 29 Co-L L. REV. 837, 83s;
cf. Gage v. Irving Bank & Trust Co., 222 App. Div. 92, 225 N. Y. Supp. 476 (2d Dep't
1927), aff'd, 248 N. Y. 554, 162 N. E. 522 (1928).
22. Genet v. Hunt, 113 N. Y. 158, 21 N. E. 91 (1889). It has been suggested that
the mass of conflicting decisions concerning dispositive provisions referring to statutes of
distribution as criteria of intent permits no generalizations. See Lemr, Destructibility
of Inter Vivos Trusts (Unpublished thesis in Yale Law School Library, 1938) 22.
23. Beam v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 182, 28 N. Y. Supp.
403 (1st Dep't 1936); Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co. of X. Y., 250 X. Y. 298, 165
NT. E. 454 (1929); see Comment (1937) 22 COaN. L. Q. 434, 436.
24. See Record on Appeal, p. 33, City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 278 X. Y.
134, 15 N. E. (2d) 553 (1938) ("... Trustee shall sell any securities remaining . . .
and shall distribute . .. principal and income . . .in default of appointment . . . [to
distributees] . . .").
25. Mayer v. Chase Nat. Bank. 143 Misc. 714, 257 N. Y. Supp. 161 (Sup. Ct. 1932),
aff'd, 240 App. Div. 877, 267 N. Y. Supp. 939 (1st Dept 1933) ; Schoellkupf v. Marine
Trust Co. of Buffalo, 267 N. Y. 358, 196 X. E. MS (1935); Whittemore V. Equitable
Trust Co. of N. Y., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929).
26. The failure to reserve a power of revocation would point to a "full formal" dis-
position of the corpus, a much discussed criterion. See Comment (1937) 46 Y.,,E L. J.
1005, 1020-21; Lesar, supra note 22, at 26; cf. cases cited supra note 25.
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the corpus in default of appointment 27 or by making a default gift of the
corpus to her estate,28 that her inclusion of the dispositive provision, to her
distributees under New York Law, can justifiably be interpreted to evince
a contrary intent. The chosen phrase may well be said to have designated
the beneficiaries and their respective shares rather than their manner of
taking. Similar reasoning found favor with the Court of Appeals in Whitte-
more v. Equitable Trust Company of New York.2 9 In that case the court
felt that a gift to one's heirs should create in them a remainder whenever
similar language would be sufficient to produce a remainder in third persons.-"
Application of this doctrine, which seems to reverse the presumption stated
by Doctor v. Hughes, would probably have resulted in a contrary conclusion
in the instant case.31
It is not difficult to write a document which will clearly express an intent
either to create a remainder or a reversion ;32 and in the absence of such
expression the existence of any actual intention may be questioned. In the
latter instance, any standards evolved to gauge intent are at best convenient
devices to permit a determination of each case upon its equities.33 By finding
that the settlor in the instant case intended that the trust corpus revert to
her general estate, the court entirely cut off the residuary legatees to whom
ninety per cent of the original estate had been bequeathed; as his statutory
share the husband took half the net estate, or $30,500; a like amount went
to the general legatees. Had a remainder been created by the gift in default
of appointment, all of the beneficiaries would have received approximately
similar shares, except that the settlor's mother-a residuary legatee and the
will's principal beneficiary for life-would have received about $14,000, and
general legacies for the mother of the settlor's first husband and for a maus-
oleum would have abated.34 It cannot be denied, however, that a strict appli-
cation of the tenets of worthier title pointed to a reversion in the instant case.
The court here seems to have felt bound by that rule despite the ease with
27. Sperry v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 154 App. Div. 447, 139 N. Y. Supp. 192
(1st Dep't 1913); Phelps v. Thompson, 119 Misc. 875, 198 N. Y. Supp. 320 (Sup. Ct.
1922).
28. Abraham v. Abraham, 245 App. Div. 302, 280 N. Y. Supp, 825 (1st Dcp't 1935)
(to estate in default of appointment) ; Kingsbridge Improvement Co. v. American E%-
change Nat. Bank, 222 App. Div. 31, 225 N. Y. Supp. 355 (1st Dep't 1927) (to executors
in default of appointment), aff'd, 249 N. Y. 97, 162 N. E. 597 (1928).
29. 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929).
30. See id. at 302, 165 N. E. at 456.
31. But see the narrow construction afforded the JhiUttemore case in Berlenbach v.
Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 260 N. Y. 539, 184 N. E. 83 (1932).
32. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 19, 27, 28.
33. Compare Davies v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 380, 288 N. Y.
Supp. 398 (lst Dep't 1936) with Beam v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 248 App.
Div. 182, 288 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dep't 1936). But reconciliation has been attempted,
See Comment (1937) 22 CORx. L. Q. 434.
34. The distribution of the net trust corpus of $61,000, according to the New York
laws of distribution would have been as follows: to the husband, $5,000 plus one-half
of the balance, or $33,000; to the mother and father each one-half of the remainitg
$28,000. N. Y. DECENT ESTATE LAW § 83(2).
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which it could have found a contrary intent so as to reach the more equitable
result Apparently, the hazards of this archaic doctrine, even as a rule of
construction, can best be avoided by its statutory abolition. 35
MODIFICATION OF LABILITY OF GUARANTOR Ix REORGANIZATION
OF PRII CIPAL DEBTOR*
IN A reorganization under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act the plan,
duly confirmed by the District Court, gave bondholders common stock in
the new corporation. The bonds of the old corporation were guaranteed by
the defendant, as to whom no reorganization proceedings were pending. The
plan provided for a release of the guarantor "in consideration of the transfer
of all the assets of the debtor to the new corporation and the surrender of
the common stock of the debtor"' by the guarantor. Ninety-six per cent of
the bondholders accepted, and the several creditors who objected to tile decree
of the court confirming the plan met with no success. The plaintiff, a bond-
holder who belonged to the same class as the objecting creditors, did not
intervene, but instituted a separate suit in the Municipal Court of Chicago
against the guarantor. While this action was pending, he petitioned the
Bankruptcy Court to vacate its decree releasing the guarantor, on the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction over liabilities not those of the debtor, but
the petition was denied and the plaintiff did not appeal. The Municipal Court,
ignoring the holding of the Bankruptcy Court, granted the plaintiff his judg-
ment against the guarantor, and after an intermediate reversal 2 the Supreme
Court of Illinois upheld the Municipal Court decision.3 On certiorari, the
Supreme Court of the United States,4 expressly refusing to voice any opinion
on the power of the Bankruptcy Court to approve the plan of reorganization,
reversed the Illinois ruling on the ground that the finding of the Bankruptcy
Court that it had jurisdiction over the claims of the creditors against the
guarantor was res judicata.5
35. Apparently the only surviving justification of the doitrine may be found in its
availability to preclude tax evasion through inter viz'os trusts limited to the settlor for
life with "remainders" to his heirs. Morsman v. Comm'r of Int. Re%., 90 F. (2d) 18
(C. C. A. 8th, 1937), ccrt. denied, 302 U. S. 701 (1937), 113 A. L. IR 457 (1933), (1933)
38 COL. L. REv. 195.
* Stoll v. Gottlieb, 59 Sup. Ct. 134 (U. S. 1938).
1. The exmct provisions of the agreement are not ascertainable from case or record.
The statement quoted recurs in the briefs as well as in the decisions. Brief for Petition-
er, p. 3, Stoll v. Gottlieb, 59 Sup. Ct. 134 (U. S. 1938).
2. Gottlieb v. Crowe and Stoll, 289 Ill. App. 595, 7 N. E. (2d) 469 (1937), (1937)
36 Mficx. L. Rav. 318.
3. Gottlieb v. Crowe, ct aL, 368 Ill. 88, 12 N. E. (2d) 881 (1938), (1933) 51 HArnv.
L. Ray. 1450.
4. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 59 Sup. Ct. 134 (U. S. 1938).
5. This case does not necessarily involve the full faith and credit clause of the Con-
stitution, but a violation of the duty of state courts to give due effect as res judicata to
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The Supreme Court's view that the decision of a court that it has juris-
diction over the subject matter is res judicata in a later proceeding between
the same parties does not come as a surprise.0 It was established by the
famous Baldwin cases that a finding on jurisdiction over the parties to a
proceeding was not open to collateral attack.1 Although early decisions did
not in terms distinguish between the effect of a finding of a court as to juris-
diction over the person and over the subject matter, it has been suggested
that such a distinction was in fact entertained by the courts.8 The present
decision does not entirely end this controversy," but in applicable cases it
clearly applies to a finding not only of quasi-jurisdictional, but also of strictly
jurisdictional facts. 10 The court confines its ruling to cases in which the issue
of jurisdiction has been raised by and decided against the party who later
contests it. Whether or not the fact that a party participated in proceedings
without contesting the jurisdiction of the court will estop that party from
later collaterally attacking the decision remains unsettled."' Likewise unan-
swered is the question of whether a jurisdictional issue may be determined
finally as to a non-participating party when members of his class have
contested the question. The answer to this problem will be of special im-
portance in reorganization proceedings, for it will determine whether a
minority creditor can upset a plan of reorganization by way of collateral
attack after other creditors have unsuccessfully raised the same issue in direct
proceedings.' 2
The second issue raised by the principal case is not so easily disposed of.
The court refused to pass on whether a reorganization court can approve a
decisions of federal courts sitting in the state. The judgments of such federal courts are
entitled to the same treatment as judgments of the state's own courts. A violation of this
principle raises a federal question. JUDICIAL CODE § 237b, 43 STAr. 937 (1925), 28 U. S. C.
§ 344b (1934) ; Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130 (U. S. 1875) ; Crescent City Live
Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 141 (1887); see 1 VILLOUDGuy, THE COM-
STITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) § 146.
6. See (1936) 46 YALE L. 3. 159; IMedina, Conclusiveness of Rulings on Jurisdic-
tion (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 238.
7. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522 (1931) ; American
Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932), (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 427.
S. Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U. S. 327 (1894); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S.
506 (1897). Doubt was expressed by the American Law Institute. RESTATEmENT, Con..
FLIcr OF LAWS (1934) § 451, caveat.
9. 59 Sup. Ct. 134, at 139 (U. S. 1938). An excellent discussion of the land and
status problems left unsettled by this decision appears in (1939) 39 COL. L. Rnv. 274.
Compare (1939) 6 U. OF CHI. L. REa. 293, arriving at some contrary conclusions,
10. See Gottlieb v. Stoll, 59 Sup. Ct. 134, 140 (U. S. 1938).
11. Attack on the court's jurisdiction has been allowed in such a situation. Vallely
v. Northern Fire & M. Ins. Co., 254 U. S. 348 (1920). The court distinguished the
principal case on this ground and on the ground that the attack in the former ease was
a direct one. A decision rendered at the same time as the principal case is also based
on actual adjudication of the jurisdictional question. Davis v. Davis, 59 Sup. Ct. 3 (U. S,
1938), (1939) 39 COL. L. RE . 274, (1939) 52 HARv. L. Rxv. 683; see Comment (1936)
45 YALE L. J. 1100, 1235, 1245.
12. For a thorough discussion of the problem of collateral attack on 77B proceed-
ings, see Comment (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 827.
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plan which affects the rights of creditors against third persons who have
guaranteed the obligation of the debtor corporation. The Act gives a reor-
ganization court exclusive jurisdiction over "the debtor and his property."' 3
And the only federal case squarely in point1 4 states that the reorganization
court has no jurisdiction to confirm a plan which modifies the obligation of
a guarantor ;15 consequently a small minority was pennitted to upset a seem-
ingly fair scheme of rehabilitation. But the jurisdiction of a reorganization
court should be broader.' 6
In the majority of reorganization cases the parties primarily concerned will
be the corporate creditors and stockholders. If the obligations of a corporation
are guaranteed by a third party, the latter, as a potential creditor, will also
be interested in participating in the reorganization proceedings. His coopera-
tion may well be indispensable to an effective reorganization. Especially will
this be true if a substantial part of the debtor's assets have been transferred
to the surety in order to protect his claim for reimbursement. In order to
13. BAx- uPTcY Acr § 111, 52 STAT. 884, 11 LT. S. C. A. § 511 (Supp. 1938), for-
merly BANKRUPTcy Acr §77B (a), 48 STA.T. 912, 11 U. S. C. §207(a) (1934). The
principal case arose under the old § 77B. The changes made by the Chandler Bill have
not affected the problem under discussion. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, only
the section numbers of the new act will be cited.
14. In re Diversey Building Corp., 86 F. (2d) 456 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), cert. denied,
sub nora. Diversey Bldg. Corp. v. Weber, 300 U. S. 663 (1937). This case involved a
plan of reorganization which provided for an exchange of the bonds issued by the debtor
for bonds of equal principal amount bearing a lower rate of interest. The surety which
had guaranteed the old bonds was willing to guarantee the new issue. Although the
creditors were indemnified through other provisions for the loss caused to them by tle
reduction of the interest, the court allowed the minority to upset the plan despite a show-
ing that the proceedings against the surety would adversely affect the debtor's estate.
The case is criticized in (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 344, 346.
In Illinois it had been held that the court had jurisdiction to confirm a release of te
guarantor. Barnett v. Gittlitz, 290 Il1. App. 212, 8 N. E. (2d) 517 (1937). In view of
the holding of the Supreme Court of Illinois in the principal case [Gottlieb Y. Crowe,
368 Ill. 88, 12 _N. E. (2d) 881 (1938)] and in view of Johnson v. Finn, 294 I1. App. 616,
14 N. E. (2d) 240 (1938), the Gittlitz case may no longer be considered authoritative.
15. A case frequently cited for the proposition that a court of reorganization haq
no jurisdiction over the liability of third parties is Re 1775 Broadway Corp., 79 F. (2d)
108 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). This case cannot be considered as denying the jurisdiction of
the court over guarantors, despite its language, as it holds the court unauthorized to
release the guarantor from his liability for misrepresentation, but at the same time
jurisdiction is assumed over the matter by forbidding the creditors' committee to settle
with the guarantor. As to whether the court has the power to release the guarantor from
liability for mismanagement-a creditors' claim-the court assumed jurisdiction on the
ground that such a claim belongs to the trust res. Cf. Kripke, Collateral Liability under
Section 77B (1937) 35 MicH. L. REv. 432, 438, criticizing the court's inconsistency.
16. A bill to amend Section 77B was passed by the House on fay 4, 1936, vwhich
made express reference to the jurisdiction of the court over obligations of guarantors.
H. R. REP. No. 11917, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 80 Co.w. REc. 6657. No reason
appears, however, for supposing that the omission of any such provision in § 77B or
§ 216 is conclusive as to the illegality of the confirmation of a plan which modifies the
obligation of a guarantor.
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include such property in a plan of reorganization the guarantor's consent
must be obtained. It is also possible that the guarantor will be the only party
willing to furnish the necessary capital for a sound reorganization of the
embarrassed corporation, and then only if his obligation of guarantee be modi-
fied. It is not enough that the majority of creditors secured by the guarantee
are ready to modify their claim against the surety despite their right to hold
him to an immediate payment of their claims in full. For if the court cannot
impose the plan of the majority on dissenting creditors, it would be virtually
impossible to obtain any consents to the plan; self-interest would induce all
creditors to dissent, as only dissenters would retain their right against the
surety.
17
The argument has been made that Section 16 of the Bankruptcy AeON
prevents the court from in any way altering or discharging the obligation of
a guarantor.1 9 But this section preserves the right of a creditor against the
surety in case of a discharge of the principal; it should have no bearing on
the question of whether or not the creditors may contract not to hold the
surety liable.20 Similar use was sought to be made of Section 76,21 since
repealed, which provided for the extension of the liability of guarantors in
proceedings under Sections 74 and 75. Because that section was not expressly
made applicable to Section 77B, it was said that the reorganization court had
been given no jurisdiction over guarantors.2 2 But it by no means followed
that the court would have no power to impose on dissenting creditors an agree-
ment reached by the majority of creditors and the guarantor.
The powers given to the court of reorganization are much broader than
those of an ordinary bankruptcy court. The court can alter the rights of
creditors, secured and unsecured.23 Its jurisdiction is not limited to property
in the actual or constructive possession of the debtor. Property in the hands
17. See (1937) 36 Mici-. L. REv. 318, 320. In this discussion, the terms "guarantor"
and "surety" will be used indiscriminately.
18. 30 STAT. 550 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 34 (1934). This section is applicable il re-
organization proceedings. BAXKRUPTcY ACT § 102, 52 STAT. 883, 11 U. S. C. A. § 502
(Supp. 1938).
19. See (1937) 23 VA. L. REv. 601, 602.
20. If the plan of reorganization does not provide for a release of the guarantor,
the creditor, although consenting to a reorganization of the principal debtor, may still
sue the surety. Brand v. Schmitz, 293 111. App. 114, 11 N. E. (2d) 974 (1937) ; Durfee
Trust Co. v. Steiger, 4 N. E. (2d) 1014 (Mass. 1936); Seixas v. Hegeman, 158 Miw.,
560, 285 N. Y. Supp. 838 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 246 App. Div. 813, 287 N. Y. Supp. 331
(1st Dep't 1936) ; Union Trust Co. of Rochester v. Willsea, 275 N. Y. 164, 9 N. E. (2d)
820 (1937), (1937) 24 VA. L. REv. 191. These holdings are to the effect that even the
acceptance of newly issued securities does not prevent the creditor from suing the surety
on his original obligation. Doubts have been expressed as to the fairness of this result.
See FINLETTER, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY (1937)
330; (1936) 3 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 661, 662.
21. Section 76 has now been repealed by the Act of June 22, 1938, 52 STAT. 040,
11 U. S. C. A. §204 (Supp. 1938).
22. See In re Hygrade Dye Works, Inc., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. f 3083 (E. D. N. Y.
1934); (1936) 3 U. OF Cm. L. Rzv. 661; (1937) 36 Micn. L. REV. 318, 320.
23. BANKRUPTCY ACT § 216(1), 52 STAT. 895, 11 U. S. C. A. § 616 (1) (Supp. 1938).
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of pledgees 24 and mortgagees2 5 can be included in a plan of reorganization
and lawfully acquired property interests of creditors can be disturbed'1 And
the provision of the Act affirmatively giving the court exclusive jurisdictiun
over the debtor and his property should not be interpreted so as to negative
the implication of further powers. To a certain extent at least, the court
can prevent'actions by creditors which would have serious adverse effects on
the debtor's reorganization or hinder the execution of the plan.' Such an
adverse effect on the reorganization-and hence on the property of the
debtor-would clearly be brought about if dissenting creditors attempt to
enforce their right against the guarantor. Harm to the debtor's estate will
certainly result if a surety who holds assets of the debtor as security for its
claim for reimbursement is sued to judgment. Under these circumstances
even ordinary bankruptcy courts have stayed action by creditors against a
solvent surety so as to prevent depletion of the assets of the estate.2 3 Indirect
hindrances to a reorganization have been held sufficient ground to stay an
action against a solvent subsidiary of a parent corporation undergoing reor-
ganization and to enjoin the transfer of the assets of the subsidiaryP Even
24. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.. 72 F. (2d) 443
(C. C. A. 7th, 1934), aff'd, 294 U. S. 648 (1935), (1935) 48 H{.iv. L. Rev. 1430; In re
Prudence Bonds Corp., 75 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
25. Grand Boulevard Investment Co. v. Strauss, 78 F. (2d) 180 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935);
cf. It re Norfolk Weavers, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 495 (D. Del. 1935); Provident Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. University Evangelical Lutheran Church, 90 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 9th,
1937). Contra: Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Nineteenth & Walnut Streets Corp.,
79 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935).
26. In re Hotel Gibson Co., 11 F. Supp. 30 (S. D. Ohio 1935) ; see F nrL-TM, op. cit.
supra note 20, at 153. The court, in order to determine whether it shall exercise juris-
diction over specific property, will ascertain the balance of conveniences among the
debtor, his creditors and interested third parties and determine the substantiality of the
debtor's right. See (1938) 38 Cos. L. REv. 344; Comment (1936) 49 H,v. L. REv.
1111, 1128 et seq.
27. Cf. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., -294 U. S.
6,48 (1935). The court has the power to issue orders necessary for the protection of its
jurisdiction. BANKRupTcY AcT § 2(15), 52 ST.,AT. 842, 11 U. S. C. A. § 11(15) (Supp.
1938).
28. In ra Federal Biscuit Co., 203 Fed. 37 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913); In re Collier, 4 1.
Supp. 700 (S. D. N. Y. 1933); cf. In re Eastern Comm. & Imp. Co., 129 Fed. 847 (D.
-Mass. 1904). But cf. In re Franklin, 106 Fed. 666 (D. Mass. 1901), aff'd, sub. n101.
Jaquith v. Rowley, 188 U. S. 620 (1902); In re Ennis & Stoppani, 171 Fed. 755 (S. D.
N. Y. 1909).
In a reorganization the additional danger arises that if securities issued by the debtor
corporation are pledged to the surety, an action forcing the latter to sell them vwould
greatly endanger any plan. since the purchasers would constitute a new class of creditors
for which no provision had been made. Cf. (1935) 44 YALe L. J. 677, 678.
29. In re Associated Gas & Electric Co., 11 F. Supp. 359 (N. D. X. Y. 1935). But
cf. In re Goebel, Inc., 80 F. (2d) 849 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), (1936) 30 ILL L. REv. 934;
see FiNL=ETER, op. cit. supra note 20, at 148.
Another, perhaps extreme case involved an injunction against a suit by a creditor
against the debtor and an individ-'al in no way connected w ith the reorganization pro-
ceedings, issued on the ground that the latter might claim a jury trial and thus delay-
the reorganization. In re United Textile Print Works, 12 F. Supp. 851 (E. D. X. Y.
1935).
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where the guarantor does not hold assets of the debtor and where there is
no direct property interest of the debtor in the surety's estate, 3" the courts
should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the creditor's claim against the
guarantor. For if the plan of reorganization requires the cooperation of the
guarantor it will be effectively blocked by a creditor's action against him.'l
It is probably true that a threatened injury to the debtor's plan of reor-
ganization will not remove all limits to the jurisdiction of the court. But
Section 21632 of the Act allows the inclusion in the plan of reorganization
of provisions which alter or modify the "rights" of secured and unsecured
creditors. Nowhere are these "rights" expressly confined to rights against the
debtor.3 3 It may therefore be reasonable to conclude that the court's juris-
diction should extend to all creditors' "rights" arising out of the original
debtor-creditor relationship, even though those rights are claims against a
third party guarantor. 34 From a functional point of view, the creditor secured
by a guaranty should be treated like other secured creditors of the debtor
corporation, and his rights in the security should be equally subject to modi-
fication."a
It may be argued, however, that a plan providing for the release of the guar-
antor would amount to an unconstitutional interference with the property
30. In order for the court to exercise jurisdiction it is not a prerequisite that the
debtor have any equity left in such property. A reorganization may be had solely for
the adjustment of creditors' claims. Cf. In re Central Funding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 256
(C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
31. In all probability the surety's performance of the agreement made between hm
and the majority of creditors will contain a condition to the effect that the surety will
only be bound if he is not exposed to suit by any creditor.
32. 52 STAT. 895, 11 U. S. C. A. §616 (1) (Supp. 1938).
33. In a case generally cited for the proposition that a court of reorganization has
no jurisdiction over rights of creditors against third parties guaranteeing the debtor's
obligation, the court expressly grounded the lack of jurisdiction onl the fact that the
guaranty did not secure an obligation of the corporation in reorganization, but certifi-
cates evidencing the right of their holders in specific property held by the debtor as trus.
tee. "The question would have been different, if the appellants held the debtor's bolnds.
But the appellants here are certificate holders, not creditors of the debtor." In re Nine
North Church Street, 82 F. (2d) 186, 189 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936). The court firther pointed
out that the suit against the guarantor would not embarrass the debtor.
34. Such jurisdiction is familiar in other situations. For example, a clain agalint a
surety on a bond given to the bankrupt's creditors in consideration of their leaving the
bankrupt in possession of his property can be enforced by the trustee. In re Walker
Grain Co., 3 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925). A trustee can enforce and compromise
the double liability of stockholders or claims against officers of a corporation for inli-
management. Cf. In re Berwald Shoe Co., 1 F. (2d) 494 (N. D. Tex. 1924), ret,'d, 10 F.
(2d) 275 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926). In Doty v. Love, 295 U. S. 64 (1935) the court exer-
cised jurisdiction over a compromise of the rights of creditors against shareholders of a
corporation.
35. There is some analogy to the situation of creditors of a bankrupt partnership.
Though to some extent the estate of the 'firm and the estates of the individual partners
are treated as distinct entities, the court has jurisdiction over the creditor's claims agail_'t
the partners as sureties for the firm even when the partners are not themselves adjudged
bankrupt.
rights of creditors. But it is established that the right of a creditor to enforce
his claim may be considerably delayed and subjected to tle risks of a new
business.36 Although it has been said that the provisions of Section 77B
affect only the remedy of the creditor,-, it has been held constitutiona to force
a dissenting creditor to accept securities of a different kind in lieu of his
original rights giving him an interest in specific property., a Likewise a change
of priorities may be lawful if new securities have to be issued to provide
new capital for the reorganized corporation, despite the violation of the
contractual obligation of the debtor not to create securities of higher rank.
Even agreements of conditional sale have been disregarded by some courts,
the vendor being considered a secured creditor, so that the property, title to
which had not as yet passed to the vendee, might be included in a plan of
reorganization.40 There is, nothing sacred in a security consisting of the
contractual obligation of a third party that should entitle it to higher dignity
and stronger constitutional protection than the right of a creditor in some
specific property 'which secures an obligation of the debtor.4 ' Nor is the
view novel that a court may have power to force dissenters to give up rights
against third parties, 42 for the United States Supreme Court has upheld the
decree of a court confirming a plan which provided for the release of cor-
porate shareholders from their statutory liability, although the reorganization
36. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 648
(1935).
37. See Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947, 954 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935);
1 GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIzATIONS (1936) §32. However, if the plan provides for
a reasonable equivalent for the rights the creditors have lost, the due process clause is
not violated. Cf. note 49, infra; In re Central Funding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 256, 261
(C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; see Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. University Ev. Lutheran Church,
90 F. (2d) 992, 996 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) to the effect that no plan confirmed by the
court in accordance with § 77B constitutes a violation of the due process clause, even
if it deprives a person of his property. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rad-
ford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935) ; Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 30D U. S.
440 (1937).
38. it re Georgian Hotel Corp., 82 F. (2d) 917 (C. C. A. 7th, 19301 ; In re Cen-
tral Funding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 256 (C. C.. A. 2d, 1935) ; In re Caffall Oil Corp., 22 F.
Supp. 484 (W. D. La. 1937).
39. Re Prima Co., 88 F. (2d) 785 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935); cf. Kansas City Terminal
Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445 (1926); In re Park--43d Street Corp.,
93 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; FixLEE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 405 ct scq.
40. In re White Truck & Transfer Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. f 2326.07 (S. D. Cal.
1934) ; cf. In re Burgemeis.ter Brewing Corp., 84 F. (2d) 388 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; In re
Hotel Gibson Co., 11 F. Supp. 30 (S. D. Ohio, 1935). Contra: In re Lake's Laundry,
Inc., 79 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) (L. Hand, J., dissenting), (1935) 49 HAP.
L. REv. 328; In re Ideal Laundry, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 719 (N. D. Cal., 1935), (1935) 24
U. OF PA. L. REv. 250, (1935) 35 CoL. L. Ray. 1305.
41. It may be noted that a secured obligation is not entitled to higher constitutional
protection than an unsecured one. See Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947,
954 (C. C. A. 4th,- 1935) ; cf. In re Burgh, 7 F. Supp. 184 (N. D. Il. 1933) ; 1 Gu-n-s,
op. cit. supra note 37, at 102.
42. See note 34, supra.
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was carried out under a state statute and was thus subject to the limitations
of the contracts clause.
43
Even though the power to alter the obligation of a guarantor be conceded,
many arguments have been advanced against the propriety of modifi-
cation. It has been said that the value of guarantees as securities would be
greatly impaired if the guarantor could use a reorganization of the principal
debtor to free himself of his obligation. 44 But it is well settled that the creditor
could have the transaction set aside in case the guarantor's purpose in insti-
tuting reorganization proceedings were fraudulent. 45 MIore important, it may
be assumed that no guarantor will be released unless it is to the ultimate
advantage of the creditors that he should be. The fact that a majority of
creditors consider the plan providing for a release a fair one, while not con-
clusive, at least affords a strong argument in favor of its reasonableness, 1
And the mere existence of the court's power to confirm such a plan by no
means necessitates its exercise except where it is obviously advantageous.' 7
The reasonableness of modification when the guarantor is solvent presents
some difficulty. If the guarantor is able to make full payment out of current
funds, the court would of course be reluctant to alter the contractual obliga-
tion. But in the usual case of a large indebtedness to numerous guaranteed
certificate holders, payment could be made, if at all, only after a protracted
liquidation period. Rather than incur the additional delays that would be
incident to an almost meaningless judicial determination of whether or not
the guarantor is solvent,48 the court should be willing to modify the obligation
in return for partial satisfaction of the claim. The reasonableness of such a
solution does not seem open to question, so long as the court performs its
duty of stipulating that adequate consideration be furnished by the guar-
antor.
49
As far as the record in the principal case shows, the plan of reorganization
which provided for the release of the guarantor was a fair one. The guarantor
was solvent, but he gave good consideration for the release by transferring
43. Doty v. Love, 295 U. S. 64 (1935). The right to hold shareholders to the pay-
ment of assessments in accordance with a statute imposing a "double liability" on them
is a creditor's right. 1 GERDES. op. cit. supranote 37, at 611.
44. See (1937) 36 MICH. L. REv. 318, 319.
45. The language of the decision in it re Nine North Church Street, Inc., 82 F. (2d)
186 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), is so broad as to obscure the fact that there such a fraudulent
scheme was involved.
46. Cf. Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co., 20 F. (2d) 808 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927):
Gerdes, A Fair Plan of Corporate Reorganication (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rrv. 1, 20.
47. Such plan should only be confirmed by the court if the business of the debtor i'a
intrinsically sound and if it is certain that a liquidation would not be more appropriate.
The court must be convinced of the economic feasibility of the plan. See FiNLE1TER, op.
cit. supra note 20, at 450.
48. On the question of the delay which would otherwise ensue see Dodd, Rcoreaniva-
lion Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What? (1935) 48 I-IARv. L. REv. 1100, 1123;
Comment (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 247, 253, n. 41.
49. The plan must probably live up to the standards of the Boyd case [Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913)]. As to what the standards of the Boyd case
might or might not be, see FINLETrER, op. cit. supra note 20, at 402 et seq.
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all the assets of the principal debtor to the new corporation. If all the assets
were in the guarantor's hands it may be assumed that no reorganization would
have been possible without his cooperation. Moreover, ninety-six per cent
of the bondholders assented to the plan. In just such a case does it seem
that a court should exercise its power to confinn a plan releasing the guarantor
and to impose it upon dissenters. In just such a case is it apparent that
solicitude for the rights of a recalcitrant minority does not furnish sufficient
reason for destroying the last hopes of unsecured creditors by rendering im-
possible the preservation of the enterprise.
'WITHDRAWAL OF REGISTRATION AS A BAR TO SEC STOP ORDER
PROCEEDINGS*
SEcTIox 8(d) of the Securities Act of 19331 empowers the Securities and
Exchange Commission to promulgate stop orders barring from the mails 2 and
the channels of interstate commerce securities issued under misleading regis-
tration statements. The efficacy of this mode of protecting the investing public
from the depredations of unscrupulous promoters was seriously imperilled by
the case of Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission.3 That decision
raised unforeseen limitations on the Commission's jurisdiction to hold hear-
ings preliminary to issuance of a stop order.4 For some reason the Supreme
Court gave its approbation to the registrant's withdrawal of a still ineffective
registration statement subsequent to the institution of stop order hearings,
and held that such a withdrawal, by removing the registrant from the Com-
mission's jurisdiction, rendered nugatory any attempt to subpoena witnesses
in furtherance of the hearings. The decision rests partly on the premise that
withdrawal is a complete and satisfactory termination of stop order pro-
ceedings.5 Viewed in that light the case may be interpreted as granting regis-
trants an absolute privilege to retreat from the range of the Commission's
investigatory power.0
Although the Jones decision may primarily have been no more than a
general warning to the administrative agencies against the use of Star Chamber
methods, the Court may also have assumed that investors would be ade-
quately protected from unscrupulous promoters by the criminal provisions
of the Securities Act.7 Unfortunately the latter assumption, at least, is of
* Securities and Exchange Commission v. Hoover, 25 F. Supp. 4S4 (N. D. Il1. 1933).
1. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77a (1934).
2. Securities sold only to persons residing in the state in which the issuing corprm-
tion is incorporated or in the state in which the person issuing is resident are not affected.
48 STAT. 906,15 U.S.C. §77c(a) (11) (1934).
3. 298 U. S. 1 (1936), Comment (1936) 31 IT.. L. Rv. 369, see (1936) 49 H.n
L. REv. 1369, 34 Micia. L. REv. 1031. 84 U. or P.%. L. RE. 1019, 23 VA. L. RLv. 3.
4. 48 STAT. 80 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77h(e) (1934).
5. See Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 293 U. S. 1, 23 (1936).
6. See Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 32 (1936) dis-
senting opinion).
7. 48 STAT. 87 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77x (1934).
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questionable validity. To subject the promoter to criminal prosecution the
registration statement must contain wilful misstatements. The difficulty sur-
rounding the proof of intent in criminal cases may shelter the clever swindler
from penal liability if he carefully avoids the use of flagrant misstatements
and clothes his half-truths in the protective mantle of negligent error., Con-
sequently to grant such a promoter an absolute privilege to seek shelter from
the searchlight of investigation whenever the veracity of his registration state-
ment is questioned is to deprive the investing public of its one real protection
against the unscrupulous promoter-publication of the facts surrounding his
questionable activities.9
The Commission has refused to interpret the Jones decision as granting an
absolute privilege to withdraw. Though it has refrained from any compre-
hensive definition of the limits of the privilege, it has ruled that once the
registrant has sold any securities issued under the questioned statement lie
can no longer withdraw to avoid a stop order hearing.1 This limitation
constitutes but a weak attempt to solve the problem created by the Jones case.
By delaying institution of proceedings until the registrant has marketed some
of his securities the Commission is now assured of an opportunity to carry
the hearings to their proper culmination and to protect investors in their
future dealings with the promoter involved by a stop order publication of
the questionable nature of his tactics. Unfortunately, however, though this
ruling enables the Commission effectively to wield the weapon of publicity,
its application necessitates inaction until a number of unwary investors have
been duped by the erroneous statement. Such delayed protection is better than
none at all, but it can hardly be called an adequate solution of the problem.
Should the Commission deem it inadvisable to subject a limited number
of investors to this risk of loss, it must abandon its weapon of publicity and
rely upon a strict surveillance of all statements and a free use of stop order
procedure in order to force the swindler to withdraw before he has an oppor-
tunity to market to the public. The consequences which would ensue from
such a course of action seem undesirable. Increased public expense would
result from the large staff which would be necessary to pursue more rigorous
investigations." Since the institution of stop order proceedings is in itself
8. Numerous examples of statements sufficiently misleading to warrant a stop order,
yet outside the range of the criminal sanction may be found in Comment (1939) 37 M lel.
L. REv. 452.
9. See Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission. 298 U. S. 1, 30-32 (1936)
(dissenting opinion) ; Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 79 F. (2d) 617,
620 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
10. In the Matter of National Boston Montana Mines, I S. E. C. 639 (1936); In
the Matter of Paper Sales Co., Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 1556 (1937); cf.
Northwestern Bancorporation v. Benson, 6 F. Supp. 704, 722-723 (D. Mini. 1934), affd,
292 U. S. 606 (1934) ; Motor Finance & Guaranty Corp. v. Georgia Securities Comnds-
sion, 158 Ga. 75, 122 S. E. 782 (1924). But cf. State v. Hardstone Brick Co., 172 Mmii.
328, 215 N. W. 186 (1927). Finding public interest not affected, the Commission has
permitted withdrawal where no public offering had been made, although some share
had been assigned to directors, officers, and the underwriter. In the Matter of Seneca
Petroleum Corp., Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 1720 (1938).
11. See Comment (1936) 31 ILL. L. REv. 369, 376 n. 32.
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a severe sanction, often casting doubt upon an entire issue,12 well-intentioned
promoters as well as tricksters would suffer from a promiscuous resort to the
statutory device. While reputable registrants would derive little consolation
from the privilege of withdrawing under a cloud, the gambler with no reputa-
t'on to lose could retire blithely, ready to begin the game anew. The "letter
of deficiency" 13 technique, permitting registrants to correct their own defective
statements, might serve to mitigate hardships caused by a stricter attitude;
but since even slight delay can spoil delicate "timing" plans, a too frequent
use of this relatively innocuous device can inflict grave injury on the marketer
of securities.14
The business-like manner in which the lower courts have disposed of a
recent attemptI5 to emulate Jones' successful retreat from the Commission's
jurisdiction indicates that the judiciary may now be willing to limit the Jones
ruling even more sharply than has the Commission. The Resources Corpora-
tion sought to quash stop order proceedings instituted against it li with-
drawing its registration statement. The registrant's attempt by direct appeal
to overturn the Commission's order denying leave to withdraw was turned
off on a procedural point. However, the court was forced to face the issue
squarely in a subsequent proceeding' 0 paralleling that in which the Jones
case arose. The court granted the Commission's petition for an order enforc-
12. See LANDIS, THE ADmINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) 108-1U9.
13. Section 8(d) is not invoked unless the Registration Division, after a preliminary
examination, is unable to obtain sufficient accurate information. Communication to the
YALE LAw JouRNA.L from Baldwin Bane, October 6, 1938. Statements that are filed
in bad faith [e.g., In the 'Matter of Great Dike Gold Mines, 1 S. E. C. 021 (1936)], or
are so defective as to defy amendment [e.g.. In the .Matter of Mutual Industrial Bankers,
1 S. E. C. 268 (1936)], or which present patently ridiculous schemes [e.g., In the Mat-
ter of La Luz Mining Corp., 1 S. E. C. 217 (1935)] are proceeded against at once. Com-
pare Johnson and Jackson, The Securities and Exchange Commission: Its Organriation
"and Functions Under the Sccurities Act of 1933 (1937) 4 L.Aw AND CoEP. Paoa. 3,
11; Blum, The Federal Securities Act, 1933-1936 (1938) 46 J. PoL- Eco,;. 52, 53-54.
14. Although amendments filed with the consent of the Commission prior to the
effective date are treated as a part of the registration statenent [48 STA.T. 79 (1933),
15 U. S. C. § 77h(a) (1934)], delay is not precluded. The common practice of filing a
technical amendment, automatically delaying the effective date [48 STaT. 79 (1933), 15
U. S. C. § 77h(a) (1934)] upon receipt of a letter indicates that some loss of time is ccca-
sioned until the differences between the registrant and the Commission are ironed out.
15. Resources Corporation International v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
97 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) (jurisdiction to review the Commission's order
denied since it was not "final"); Resources Corporation International v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 24 F. Supp. 580 (D. D. C. 1938) (injunction to overturn the
order and forbid the hearing refused). Both decisions turned on procedural grounds, the
courts indicating that the registrant should wait until a stop order should issue and then
invoke the statutory provision for judicial review. However, the district court, to sus-
tain its contention that the S. E. C. had not deliberately flouted the law as laid down in
the Jones case, declared the two cases might be distinguished. See Resources Corpgra-
tion International v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 24 F. Supp. 580, 580-581
(D. D. C. 1938). This decision was recently affirmed by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals. N. Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1939, p. 27, col. 4.
16. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Hoover, 25 F. Supp. 4,q (N. D. Ill.
1938).
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ing a subpoena in furtherance of the hearing, pointing to circumstances which
were said to throw the case outside the range of the Jones doctrine.
In the first place, the Commission did not initiate action against Resources
until its registration statement had become effective,' 7 whereas in the Jones
affair proceedings were instituted prior to the effective date of the registrant's
statement. Under the latter state of facts Justice Sutherland argued that the
registrant, seeking privileges yet ungranted, was in a position analagous to
that of a petitioner in equity; and that since a court is powerless to prevent
a petitioner from abandoning his demand, the Commission, a fortiori, is
similarly inhibited.18 The implication is obvious that the automatic accrual
of the demanded privileges on the effective date in the instant case renders
the analogy inapplicable. Since the corporation has received its "license" it
may be regarded as having consented to the Commission's jurisdiction.1°
Secondly, hearings were partially completed when Resources sought to
recall its statement, while Jones' request was made before they had begun.,"
To allow Resources to withdraw at this date would seem to defeat the pur-
pose of Section 8(e) 21 and render it an innocuous device by which suspected
promoters may possibly clear themselves of suspicion without running the
danger of adverse findings. The suspect might permit the hearings to con-
tinue as long as the tenor of the evidence was favorable, knowing he could
terminate the investigation by arbitrary withdrawal upon the introduction
of any adverse testimony. Justice Sutherland's analogy may again be employed
as a technical argument to prevent this result. If Resources be regarded as
a petitioner, once a final hearing has begun and the defendant is in a position
to demand affirmative relief on the pleadings, the unqualified power to with-
draw lapses.22
The fact that 650,000 shares of Resources stock of the class registered was
outstanding prior to registration provides a third distinction from the Jones
case.23 Without challenging the validity of the Commission's regulation per-
17. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Hoover, 25 F. Supp. 484, 486 (N. D.
Ill. 1938); Resources Corporation International v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
24 F. Supp. 580-581 (D. D. C. 1938).
18. See Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 18-22 (1936).
However, as the opinion admitted, specific rules of court to the contrary may qualify the
power to withdraw. Bronx Brass Foundry v. Irving Trust Co., 297 U. S. 230 (1936).
The Commission's withdrawal regulation (see note 24, infra) might well be regarded
as such a rule. In any event, the analogy lacks force since an administrative body need
not follow common law rules of procedure. See Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44 (1904); Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals: II (1923) 36 HA;LV.
L. REv. 583, 583-586.
19. Cf. Daugherty v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. (2d) 739, 74 P. (2d) 549 (1937).
20. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Hoover, 25 F. Supp. 484, 486 (N. D.
Ill. 1938).
21. See 77 CONG. REc. 937 (1933) ; Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act
of 1933 (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 171.
22. See Ex parle Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 t1. S. 86, 93-94 (1924) ; c/. Young v.
Southern Pacific Co., 25 F. (2d) 630, 631 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
23. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Hoover, 25 F. Supp. 484, 486 (N. D.
Ill. 1938) ; Resources Corporation International v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
24 F. Supp. 580, 580-581 (D. D. C. 1938).
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mitting withdrawal only when "consistent with the public interest and the
protection of investors," 24 justice Sutherland found Jones' withdrawal power
unqualified since "no investors, existing or potential" were affected.25 It may
be argued that Resources' outstanding stock, being beyond the pale of the
Act,2 6 is an immaterial fact. However, it would seem more desirable and
equally logical to maintain that though the presence of outstanding stock does
not subject the registrant to the Commission's jurisdiction, it does bring him
within the scope of the unchallenged regulation preventing indiscriminate
withdrawal.
2 7
General acceptance of these three limitations on the Jones case would
nullify its inhibitory effect on the power of the Commission properly to pro-
tect the investing public.28 The Commission need only delay proceedings
until the effective date of a registration statement in order to render its stop
order hearings withdrawal-proof. This would remove the necessity of sacri-
ficing a few unwary investors in order to give the public due warning of the
tactics of the guilty promoter, and would restore Section 8(d) to its con-
templated position as a threat to the unscrupulous. - O
24. Rule 960 General Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Act of 1933,
Securities Act Release No. 627 (Class C) (1936) ; C. C. H. Securities Act Serv. "596J
(1938). On the validity of this regulation, see Jones v. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, 12 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S. D. N.Y. 1935) ; Comment (1936) 31 ILu. L. RLv. 369,
374, n. 26.
25. See Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 23 (1936).
26. Securities disposed of prior to or within 60 days after .May 27, 1933, need not
be registered. 48 STAT. 75-76 (1933), 15 U.S. C. § 77c(a)(1) (1934).
27. The Commission has pointed out that those who purchase already circulating
securities are entitled to the protection afforded by the Act. See In the Matter of
Bankers Union Life Co., 2 S. E. C. 63, 73 (1937).
28. Since high-pressure tactics would probably be necessary to market the type of
securities involved, prompt notice at the end of the "cooling period" would prevent the
public from being endangered by the delay. See Comment (1936) 31 ILL.L. R'.- 369,
379.
29. The Commission has attempted to use § 19(b), 48 STAT. S5 (1933), 15 U. S. C.
§ 77s(b) .(1934), giving it general investigatory powers as a substitute for 8(d) and (e).
See Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 25 (1936). Neither the
public nor the registrant is afforded satisfactory protection by this procedure. Unfavor-
able testimony would place the registrant under no legal disability to sell. The question
whether this section empowers the Commission to make and publicize findings remains
open. A negative answer would mean that the average purchaser of securities would
often fail to learn an issue was suspect, although the large investor might be placed on
his guard. An affirmative answer would mean that the Commission, without notice to
the registrant, could pillory him before the public. Beyond the ephemeral protection of
a libel suit, which the cloak of official authority might cover [Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.
(2d) 135, 139 (App. D. C. 1938)], the registrant would be left without redress.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
THE HAZARD OF FRAUD IN DEEDS OF TRUST
DEEDS of trust to secure private loans have attained wide use in many
states as a substitute for ordinary mortgages.' On the whole, the trust deed
seives the same general function; yet it is said to have a two-fold advantage
over the simple mortgage without a power of sale. First, the trustee is given
the power of immediate sale upon default of principal or interest.-' Thi.
eliminates the delay of judicial foreclosure and sale, and permits a speedy.
less expensive method of realization on the security. 3 Secondly. protection
of the security from abuse or depreciation is thought to be assured by plac-
ing the title to, or lien on, the property involved4 in the hands of a supposedly
impartial third person, the trustee.5 But this second advantage may become
a distinct liability if the security is lodged with an unfaithful trustee-an
event by no means unlikely when the trustee is merely an employee or agent
of an investment firm, with whom the lender may have little personal cou-
tact. In some jurisdictions this possibility of fraudulent private foreclosure
has been forestalled by statutes which provide that the power of sale in trust
deeds or mortgages shall be exercised only through judicial foreclosure.0
But in attaining its purpose, this procedure also eliminate,, perhaps the most
desirable feature of the trust deed, the opportunity for rapid realization on
the security after default. Nor is this compromise at all universal. In the
majority of states the power of sale may still be with the trustee,? and thus
*Lustenberger et al. v. Hutchinson et al., 119 S.W. (2d) 921 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1938).
1. Trust deeds are used extensively in Alabama, California, Colorado, District of
Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. See 3 JoNEs. Mo0rr-
GAGES (8th ed. 1928) 742-785.
2. A mortgage may, of course, have a power of sale. This is not associated with
the simple type of mortgage, however, and must be expressly provided for by the terms
of the instrument. See PATTON, TITLES (1938) § 234; 3 JONES, MORTGAGEs (8th ed. 1928)
§ 2290.
3. See 1 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) 66, 3 id. at 797; 3 TIFFANv, REAL Pnoi0-
ERTY (2d ed. 1920) 2394; Dashiell, The Negotiability of Deeds of Trust in l'irgiuia (190)
3 VA. L. Rmv. 296. For a criticism of the delay and expense of judicial foreclosure, see
Fairchild, Foreclosure Methods and Costs: A Revaluation (1937) 7 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1
4. A discussion of the lien and title theories of mortgages, with a listing of state,
following each theory, is given in 3 TIFFANY, REXL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 2360-2303.
The point has been ably presented that in a particular instance a court will use which-
ever theory best allows it to reach a desired result. See Sturges and Clark, Legal Tlcomry
and Real Property Mortgages (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 691.
5. See 3 JoNES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) 797.
6. FLA. Comsp. GEN. LAWS ANN. (Skillman,. 1927) §§ 5724, 5747; IIA,\O Cooe ANmr.
(1932) § 9-101, 104; ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 95, § 23; IowA Cota (1935)
§ 12372; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) ch. 60, art. 3107; N. M. STAT. ANN.
(Courtright, 1929) § 117-301; ORE- CODE ANN. (1930) § 6-501; UTAH RFV. STAT. AN,.
(1933) § 104-55-1. The California statute, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1933) § 725A,
permits judicial foreclosure, but does not require it.
7. Foreclosures of mortgages and trust deeds are usually by power of sale in Ala-
bama, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. See PATTON, TITLES (1938) § 234, n. 241.
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the door is left open for dishonesty and consequent misuse of the security.
A recent Missouri case has pointed the problems which may then arise.8
Plaintiffs purchased from an investment company a note secured by a
trust deed. The original deed of trust was recorded; the assignment to the
plaintiffs was not. Shortly after the assignment, and without the request of
the plaintiffs as legal holders of the note, the trustee, an employee of the
investment company, foreclosed the security upon default of interest and
sold the property to the defendant's grantors.0 The trustee's conveyance,
reciting compliance with the power of sale contained in the trust deed, was
recorded. Seven and a half years later, the plaintiffs sought to set aside this
allegedly fraudulent foreclosure sale and the subsequent conveyance to the
defendants, on the ground that the Sale had not been made at plaintiffs'
request, as specified in the original deed of trust. The defendants contended
that they were bona fide purchasers for value without notice' ° and claimed
protection in their reliance on a clear record title in their grantors. The Mis-
souri court was squarely confronted with a choice between two contradictory
lines of public policy. The first, time-honored, accords all possible protection
to the "rightful owner" of an interest in land; the other, of comparatively
more recent vintage, encourages free alienability of land by protecting the
bona fide purchaser in his reliance on the record. The court chose the former
and gave judgment for the plaintiffs. The rationale of the decision was quite
in accord with a line of case-law founded on a similar major premise. In
these decisions, emphasis is placed upon the vulnerability to fraud inherent
in the trust deed form of security, with the result that any action taken under
the trust deed power of sale is very strictly construed." That a foreclosure
sale is made without the request of the legal holder of the notes is often held
sufficient to render the sale "void." 12 After stating these principles, the court
in the instant case followed its authorities in holding that since a void sale
8. Lustenberger v. Hutchinson, 119 S. W. (2d) 921 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1938).
9. The investment company, which became insolvent just before the suit began,
had retained the proceeds of the sale.
10. The deed to the defendants from the purchasers at the foreclosure sale was
dated and acknowledged 216 years prior to the time of purchase. The court, without
citing authority, held that this should have prompted the defendants to a further inves-
tigation of their title, and that therefore they were equally negligent with te plaintiff.
This conclusion is doubtful on common-sense grounds, for it is highly probable that tle
normal purchaser pays little, if any, attention to the date on his deed. The defendants
did investigate an abstract of the land they were purchasing, and found a clear record
title in their grantors. This would appear to be a sufficient precaution.
11. Miller v. Boone, 86 Tem. 74, 23 S. AN. 574 (1893) (sale set aside because not
made at proper courthouse door) ; Williamson v. Stone, 128 Ill. 129, 22 N. E. 1005 (1889)
(sale set aside because trustee unfairly fixed amount of bid); McFarlane v. Whitney,
106 S. XV. (2d) 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (incorrect posting of notice of trustee's sale
sufficient to render sale void) ; 2 PmRY, TRUSTS AND TR'sTEs (7th ed. 1929) § 602g;
3 T=AxY, Rx-k. PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 2724.
12. Magee v. Burch, 108 Mo. 336, 18 S. W. 1078 (1892); Miller v. Boone, 86 Tex.
74, 23 S. WV. 574 (1893) ; Plummer v. Knight, 156 Mo. App. 321, 137 S. \V. 1019 (1911) ;
St Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Walter, 329 Mo. 715, 46 S. IV. (2d) 166 (1931); 3
JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 2453.
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can pass no title,13 the defendant's grantors took nothing, and consequently
the defendants were left with neither title nor equity.
On this theory, the decision for the plaintiffs seems logically impregnable.1 '
But by substituting protection for the bonia fide purchaser as the major preni-
ise, an equally logical and exactly contrary ruling could be made. The desir-
ability of the latter result is more evident, for if the Missouri decision be
followed, free alienability of land which has at some time been encumbered
with a trust deed will be considerably impaired. Since a subsequent pur-
chaser can rarely learn more than an abstract of title will divulge, he will
have no way of ascertaining whether or not there is a secret equity that may
divest his title. True, the purchaser may always make inquiries of the trus-
tee, whose name appears on record, but a trustee who has committed fraud
is not apt to divulge his misbehavior to an inquiring stranger. The burden
of care should be placed on one in a better position to sustain it. Since the
creditor may participate il choosing the trustee when he enters into the
transaction,' 5 it should be his responsibility to settle on someone worthy of a
fiduciary position. The assignee of the indebtedness need not accept the
security unless he has confidence in his assignor and in the trustee. The bene-
ficiary of the trust deed is in a position to watch over his security by pwr-
sonal contact with the trustee, and by checking on the regularity of interest
payments, while the subsequent purchaser does not enter on the scene until
the fraud has been committed." Finally, the beneficiary will always have
an action against the trustee for his fraud,", and he may insure that thtre
will be assets to be recovered in such an action by stipulating fior a boid ,d
trustee.'
8
Despite the persuasiveness of the purchaser's position, a strong line ,f
authority supports the legal principles laid down in the instant cawe" Inl
many states stare decisis would compel obeisance to the basic rule that a
defective foreclosure sale is void. and that a void sale can pass no title. But
without undue violence to traditional doctrine, an opposite. reult may be
reached by applying one of several equally respectable maxim.Y" In a nU-
13. Cox v. American Land fortgage Co. of London. 88 Miss. 8kq, 40 So,. 739 (lO0);
Bowman v. Oakley, 212 S. W. 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
14. The symmetry of the court's syllogism might easily he upset if a defective sale
were merely called voidable. See note 20, infra.
15. 3 JoxEs, MORTGAGES (Sth ed. 1928) 797.
16. A note might, of course, be assigned after a fraudulent forecloure, thus putting
the assignee in a somewhat similar position. However, since the divesting of the a-
signor's interest would be of record, an assignee who accepted the security w ithout mak-
ing some sort of investigation as to its condition' would hardly be entitled to protection.
This situation is analogous to those cases in which it is held that recording of a later
fraudulent conveyance is notice to a prior grantee. See note 31, infra.
17. 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 799.
18. In Colorado, provision is made by statute for the bonding of the trustee [ee
note 34, infra]. For the bonding of trustees generally, see 1 BOGERT, TRtTSTS AN Tts-
TEES (1935) § 151. If this precaution had been taken in the instant case, the problem here
presented would probably never have arisen.
19. See notes 12 and 13, supra.
20. A court might, of course, simply overrule its authorities and hold such a de-
fective sale to be merely voidable, passing good title to a bona fide purchaser. However,
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ber of cases involving fraudulent sale or release cof a recorded encumbrance
by a trustee, or in the analogous situation of a fraudulent delivery of a deed
by the escrowee, the bona fide purchaser without notice has been protected
on a variety of grounds. In jurisdictions where the legal title la-ses to the
mortgagee er trustee,"I the beneficiary of a trust deed or the holder of an
unrecorded assignment of a mortgage has only an equitable interest in the
land. Hence it may be held that the holder of the legal title passcs that title
to a bona fide purchaser. even though such a conyveance be fraudulent a to
the equitable interests involved.22  Forecloure and the consequent vesting
of legal title cuts off prior equities,-3 and the purchaser is thus c~impletcly
protected from any lien on the land of which he has not had notice. A mre
common-place rationalization has been the est,,ppel dtoctrine. Since the holder
of the secured indebtedness has given the trustee. whio is the agent of blith
parties,24 the power to dispose of the property by sale, release er delivery,
thereby vesting him with apparent authority as regards the purchaser relying
on the record, he is often said to be estopped irom making any claim as to
his agent's lack of authoritv.
2
But the best method of achieving the desired result is by relying directly on
the underlying policy of recording statutes to protect the innocent purchaser.
In decisions taking this view the wording of the particular rccording statute
has made little difference.2  In each case, the purchaser is supported in his
reliance on a clear record title in his grantor. Under a statute which require,
in jurisdictions reaching the desired result, courts have been reluctant to disregard
precedent, and have instead used the arguments outlined above as a form of conditi-n
subsequent validating an originally "void" transfer after it had passetl into the ha vIs
of an innocent purchaser.
21. See note 4, supra. It has been stated that in Miskuri the trustee has legal title,
and that even though a sale be defective, his deed will pass such title. Sce Springfield
Engine Co. v. Donovan, 120 Mo. 423, 25 S. W. 53o t1S4; Hurst Automatic Svitclh
Co. v. St. Louis Trust Co., 216 S. W. 954. 953 (NfM. Sup. Ct. 1919). Accord: Adams v.
Boyd, 332 Mo. 484, 58 S. W. (2d) 704 (1933). Houever, it has als.o fen held that in
Missouri a mortgage or trust deed is treated merely as a security for tie payment of the
debt, and not as an outright conveyance of the title. Reynolds v. Stepanck, 339 Mfo. 804,
99 S. AV. (2d) 65 (1936) ; In re Title Guaranty Trust G., 113 S. IV. i2d) 1053 (Mo.
Ct App. 1938). Thus it would seem that in the instant case the cuurt had authority t.)
decide either way on this proposition.
22. Biffle v. Pullam, 125 'Mo. 10S, 28 S. W. 323 tI94); Bryant v. Hheert, 44 Cal.
App. 315, 186 Pac. 379 (1919); Brown v. Sheets. 197 X. C. 21A, 148 S. E. 233 (1929).
Accord: Williams v. Jackson, 107 U. S. 478 (18S2). See 3 TwF.xuy. R&'%L PWor.nrvY
(2d ed. 1920) 2727.
23. Missouri Fire Clay Works v. Ellison, 30 Mo. App. 67 €81 8); Xevman v.
Samuels, 17 Iowa 528 (1864) ; Fountain v. Pateman, IS) Ala. 153, Mt So. 75 (1914 1.
24. 3 Joxs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 2292.
25. Wrongful foreclosure of trust deed: Williams v. Mackay, 227 Mo. App. 1016,
61 S. W. (2d) 968 (1933); Davis v. Dogget, 212 N. C. 589, 194 S. E. 2$.8 (1937).
Wrongful delivery of deed left in escrow: Quick v. Milligan, 108 Ind. 411), 9 X. E. 392
(1886); Harth v. Pollock, 97 Ore. 663, 193 Pac. 232 (1420). Coilra: E .%rts v. Agnes,
4 Wis. 343 (1855). Wrongful release of recorded trust deed: Day v. 11refnton, 102 Iciwa
482, 71 N. V. 538 (1897); Vogel v. Troy, 232 Ill. 481, 83 X. E. 9t, 4 19L).
26. For an analysis of the various state recurding statutes, see Pxr,,i, TTLrrs
(1938) §§ 7-10.
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the recording of assignments of mortgages or trust deeds this is obviously
the proper result,27 and little difficulty has been found in protecting the sub-
sequent purchaser even where the statute is merely permissive and not man-
datory.28 If a theory beyond the express statutory command must be found
to protect the innocent purchaser and prior recorder as against the senior
encumbrancer, perhaps the most satisfactory is that until recordation the
interest of a grantee, mortgagee or beneficiary is subject to be divested by
another's recording first or purchasing without notice of the assignee's inter-
est.29 While there is no legal obligation to record, an interest in land does
not become absolute until it is so protected.3 0 Thus in the instant case the
assignee's carelessness in failing to record could have sufficed as a ground for
depriving him of his rights in the property.3' A somewhat more difficult
problem than that presented in the instant case arises where the plaintiff's
interest has been recorded and then fraudulently released, or foreclosed with-
out his knowledge together with a recital of a request by the beneficiary. Even
here, many jurisdictions have denied recovery to the original owner of the
interest by arguing that the owner is estopped through apparent authority
placed in the agent,3 2 or that the purchaser should be protected in his reliance
on a clear record.33
27. A typical statute is that of North Carolina. N. C. CODE A,;. (Michie, 1935)
§§ 3309, 3311. The Missouri statute reads: "Every instrument in writing that conveys
any real estate, or whereby any real estate may be affected, in law or equity . . . shall
be recorded in the office of the county in which such real estate is situated," RLv. STAT.
Mo. (1929) § 3039. Cases supporting the innocent purchaser's reliance on a clear record
title in his grantor under these or similar statutes are Adams v. Carpenter, 187 Mo. 613,
86 S. W. 445 (1905); Lewis v. Kirk, 28 Kan. 497 (1882); Wood v. North Carolina
Trust Co., 200 N. C. 105, 156 S. E. 523 (1931) ; Swasey v. Emerson, 168 Masq. 118,
46 N. E. 426 (1897). But cf. Hellweg v. Bush, 228 Mo. App. 876, 74 S. WV. (2d) 89
(1934).
28. Stettler v. Scherrer, 75 Colo. 500, 226 Pac. 858 (1924).
29. See Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts (1924) 22 Mici. L. REV. 405,
30. "There is no legal obligation upon a beneficiary in a trust deed to record it,
[But] he runs the risk of some other creditor securing a lien upon the property con-
veyed which would take precedence over his lien if the same is secured before his deed
of trust is recorded . . ." raupin v. Levinson, 142 Va. 810, 821, 128 S. E. 255, 258
(1925).
31. It has also been held that recording of a later fraudulent conveyance is sufficient
constructive notice to a prior grantee to start the statute of limitations running against
him. Thus in an action to set aside such a conveyance, the limitation period begins at
the time of recording, rather than at the actual discovery of the fraud. Nash v. Stevens,
96 Iowa 616, 65 N. W. 825 (1896); Smith v. Rector, 135 Kan. 326, 10 P. (2d) 1077
(1932). Accord: Scott v. Boswell, 136 Mo. App. 601, 118 S. W. 521 (1909). Contra:
Stevens v. Summers, 68 Ohio St. 421, 67 N. E. 884 (1903). The court in the instant
case, without citing authority, arrived at an opposite result in holding that the plaintiffs
were not barred by laches because of any constructive notice afforded by the recording
of the defendant's deed.
32. See note 25, supra.
33. Williams v. Jackson, 107 U. S. 478 (1882); Stetter v. Scherrer, 75 Colo. 500,
226 Pac. 858 (1924) ; Newan v. Fidelity Savings & Loan Assn., 14 Ariz. 354, 128 Pac.
53 (1912) ; Marsh v. Stover, 363 Ill. 490, 2 N. E. (2d) 559 (1936). But cf. Kennett v.
Herbert, 342 Ill. 464, 174 N. E. 558 (1931). The rule in Missouri seems to be contra.
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Where either the subsequent purchaser or the holder of the secured indebt-
edness must suffer through the fraudulent act of a trustee, a decision applying
one or a combination of these rationalizations to protect the innocent pur-
chaser would seem to be more in harmony with the policy of the recording
acts than the decision in the instant case. Absent a statutory provision such
as that of Colorado, where non-judicial foreclosure sales may be made only
by a public trustee, 34 the establishment of such a rule would go far toward
preventing loss through fraud of the trustee, for the duty of supervision
would be unequivocally placed on one in the best position to guard against
the risk. Although it would not give to transfers the validity of a Torrens
Act adjudication, it would remove at least one of the defects of our prewent
iecordation system without entailing the delay and expense which have pre-
vented widespread use of the Torrens system.."71
EFFECT OF UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT UPOx GRATUITos TR.\x-sFr
OF CORPORATE SHARES BY VRITTEx ASSIGNIENT*
SHARES of corporate stock are universally recognized as proper subjects
of gift or gratuitous transfer in trust.' Yet the sufficiency of particular devices
for accomplishing this type of transfer is by no means conclusively determined.
Several methods have won judicial sanction. Among them has been delivery
of a written assignment unaccompanied by delivery of the certificates and
without change of registered ownership on the corporate books.2 It is not
difficult to rationalize the effectiveness of this method by treating the written
assignment as a deed of gift. At common law delivery of such an instrument
was an acceptable substitute for actual or constructive delivery of a chattel,3
Stratton v. Cole, 203 'Mo. App. 257, 216 S. W. 976 (1919 1; Note (1903) 15 L R. A.
(x.s.) 1025.
34. A trust deed made out to anyone other than the public trustee is regarded merely
as a mortgage, and as such may be foreclosed only through judicial action. COL CON1L'.
LAws (1921) § 5044. Provision is made in §5045 for bonding the trustee.
35. See Fairchild, Economic Aspects of Land Titles (1936) M2 Co=-. L. Q. 229;Patton, The Torrcns System of Land Title Registration (1935) 19 .M Ix. L REV. 519,
531; Cushman, Torrens Title and Title Insurance (1937) 85 U. or PA. L Rev. 5S9, 692;
ef. POWELL, REGISTRATION OF THE TITLE To LAND IN THE STATE OF NeW YURK (193').
-*Johnson v. Johnson, 13 N. E. (2d) 788 (Mass. 1938).
1. CHRISTY, THE TRAxsFER OF STOCK (1929) § 36; TnoRnToN, GIFs AiD ADVA.NCE-
m.ENTS (1893) §342.
2. Francoeur v. Beatty, 170 Cal. 740, 151 Pac. 123 (1915); Harris v. Harris. "
Ill. App. 164 (1921); Leedham v. Leedham, 218 Iowa 767, 254 N. W. 61 (1934);
Grymes v. Hone, 49 N. Y. 17 (1872); Johnson v. Williams, 63 How. Pr. 233 (N. Y.
1882); De Caumont v. Bogert, 36 Hun. 382 (N. Y. 1885); Matter of Cohn, 187 App.
Di-% 392, 176 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1919); .Matter of Valentine, 122 Misc. 485,
204 N. Y. Supp. 284 (Surr. Ct. 1924) ; Note (1935) 99 A. L. P. 1077.
3. 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (1923) 354-35S; TnoRn ou, op. cit.
supra note 1, § 189; ,fechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Clialtels and of
Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instlrumenls (1927) 21 ILL L REv. 50-570;
_Note (1929) 63 A. L. R. 537.
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and the doctrine has frequently been applied to gifts of choses in action which,
like shares of corporate stock, are represented by a writing.4 In Grynes v,
Hone,5 first American case to uphold a gift of shares by delivery of a written
assignment alone, the court declared that that act "passed equitable title"O
which a court of equity would enforce against the donor's estate. In subse-
quent cases, the instrument has loosely been referred to as an "instrument of
gift," "a valid assignment," or a "conveyance." 7 Nevertheless, the presence
of the seal on the documents in question, the occasional citation of cases directly
applying the deed of gift theory,8 and the failure to apply other established
rules or to formulate clearly a new theory justify the conclusion that the
assignments can be regarded as effective common law deeds of gift. 9
Another available technique would treat delivery of the written assignment
as a constructive or symbolic delivery of the share. In two modern cases'0
the courts of New York have specifically applied this doctrine." A serious
4. Walker v. Crews, 73 Ala. 412 (1882) ; Tarbox v. Grant, 56 N. J. Eq. 199, 39 At,
378 (Ch. 1898) ; Meyers v. Meyers, 99 N. J. Eq. 560, 134 At. 95 (Ch. 1926) ; Kulp v.
March, 181 Pa. 627, 37 Ati. 913 (1897); Rennie v. Washington Trust Co., 140 Wash.
472, 249 Pac. 992 (1926); THORxTON, op. cit. supra note 1, § 294; Mechem, slipra note
3, at 570-573; Mechem, Gifts of Corporation Shares (1925) 20 ILL. L. REV. 9.
5. 49 N. Y. 17 (1872).
6. Id. at 23.
7. Johnson v. Williams, 63 How. Pr. 233 (N. Y. 1882); De Caumont v. Bogert,
36 Hun. 382 (N. Y. 1885); Matter of Valentine, 122 Misc. 486, 204 N. Y. Supp. 284
(Surr. Ct. 1924). But see Curtis v. Crossley, 59 N. J. Eq. 358, 362, 45 Ati. 905, 907
(1900). In Matter of Valentine, 122 Misc. 486, 204 N. Y. Supp. 284 (Surr. Ct. 1924),
the court contrasts the "instrument" before it with a deed of trust.
8. See e.g., the citation of Fulton v. Fulton, 48 Barb. 581 (N. Y. 1866) (gift by
deed of money due on notes) in De Caumont v. Bogert, 36 Hun. 382, 388 (N. Y. 1885).
9. Mechem, supra note 4, at 21. Where the instrument relied on is unsealed,
further doctrinal difficulties are encountered. At common law, the seal was essential, since
the departure from the requirement of delivery of the subject-matter was justified only
because of the irrebuttable character of the statement under seal. Today a more literate
era stresses the signature; the seal has become form rather than ritual. In view of the
present insignificance of the seal, it would seem that courts might sensibly disregard its
absence, and gratuitous transfers by unsealed instruments have in fact been upheld.
Francoeur v. Beatty, 170 Cal. 740, 151 Pac. 123 (1915) ; Harris v. Harris, 222 Ill. App.
164 (1921); Leedham v. Leedham, 218 Iowa 767, 254 N. W. 61 (1934); Matter of
Cohn, 187 App. Div. 392, 176 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1919). If a more elaborate
doctrinal foundation is needed, reliance may be placed upon statutes-now enacted in
thirty-one states-purporting to give unsealed documents the significance of common
law deeds. For discussion and analysis of these laws see Comment (1936) 3 U. oF Cut.
L. REV. 312.
10. Matter of Cohn, 187 App. Div. 392, 176 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1919);
Matter of Valentine, 122 Misc. 486, 204 N. Y. Supp. 284 (Surr. Ct. 1924). In Matter of
Cohn, supra, the court also refers, however, to the deed of gift doctrine. 187 App. Div.
at 397, 176 N. Y. Supp. at 228.
11. The earlier New York cases, all of them involving sealed assignments, lack
even a reference to constructive or symbolic delivery. Grymes v. Hone, 49 N. Y. 17
(1872); Johnson v. Williams, 63 How. Pr. 233 (N. Y. 1882); De Caumont v. Bogert,
36 Hun. 382 (N. Y. 1885). Inasmuch as Matter of Cohn involved an unsealed assign-
ment, use of the constructive or symbolical delivery doctrine may be explained on the
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conceptual barrier is presented by the well established rule that constructive
or symbolic delivery is effective only where manual delivery is impossible." -'
But this difficulty is minimized by the fact that gift by written assignment is
most frequently attempted when manual delivery of the certificate, if noit
impossible, is at least inconvenient when the donor desires to make the
transfer.
13
The effect of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act" on the validity of a gratu-
itous transfer by written assignment is shrouded in doubt. The Act purports
to describe the only available methods for the transfer of shares. It nientions
(1) delivery of the certificate indorsed in blank or to a specified person, aMt
(2) delivery of the certificate and a separate document containing a written
assignment or power of attorney. 1 Attempted transfer without delivery of
the certificate is given the effect of a promise to transfer, enforceable according
ground that the instrument before this court did not amount to a deed. But cf. notes
9 and 10, supra. Cf. Matson v. Abbey, 70 Hun. 475, 24 N. . Supp. 284 (Sup. Ct. 1S93) ;
McGavic v. Cossum, 72 App. Di. 35, 76 N. Y. Supp. 305 (1st Dep't 1902). But in
Matter of Valentinc the constructive delivery approach was used, although the instrument
before the court bore a seal. There is apparently no historical justification for involking
the constructive delivery technique to explain the validity of a sealed assignment. Recog-
nition of common law deeds of gift came two centuries before the constructive delivery
concept appeared in English law.
12. THORNTON, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 139, 140; Mechem, supra note 3, at 473;
Comment (1937) 6 FoRDHAm L. REv. 106, 110-114.
13. Harris N% Harris, 222 Ill. App. 164 (1921) ; Baltimore Retort and Fire Brick Co.
v. Mali, 65 Md. 93, 3 At. 286 (1886) (uncut from stock book); Parker v. Colonial
Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 111 N. J. Eq. 49, 161 At. 353 (C. 1932) (pledged); Johns.,n
v. Williams, 63 How. Pr. 233 (N. Y. 1882) (not yet delivered to donor); Matter of
Cohn, 187 App. Div. 392, 176 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1919) (in possession of donor's
firm).
Cases refusing to recognize transfer by delivery of a written assignment alone are
put upon any of several argumentative bases. The English doctrine is that title to a
share can be acquired only in the manner prescribed by the by-laws of the corporation,
i.e. by transfer on the corporate books. Beech v. Keep, 18 Beav. 285 (Ch. 1854);
Milroy v. Lord, 4 DeG. F. & J. 263 (Ch. App. 1862); Nanney v. Morgan, 37 Ch. D.
346 (1888) ; In re Andrews, [1902] 2 Ch. 394; cf. In re Lee, [1918] 2 Cit. 320. Maryland
is the only American state which has followed the English rule. Baltimore Retort and
Fire Brick Co. v. Mali, 65 Md. 93, 3 At. 286 (1,S6). In Allen-West Comm. Co. v.
Grumbles, 129 Fed. 287 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904) the court rendered verbal obeisance to this
doctrine in refusing to give effect to a sealed assignment of shares, but the facts indicate
that fraud upon creditors and lack of donative intent were the real grounds of decision.
An intermediate position, taken by the New Jersey Chancery court in Smith v. Burnet,
34 N. 3. Eq. 219 (Prerog. Ct. 1881), aff'd, 35 N. 3. Eq. 314 (1882), insists upon delivery
of the certificate as the most effective method of giving the donee dominion and control
over the share. But the force of the ruling is weakened by a specific finding of lack
of donative intent.
14. Adopted in twenty-seven states and territories, as follows: Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Yorl:,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wisconsin.
15. UxiFo SiocK TRANSFER AcT § 1.
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to the law of contracts.' 6 Thus it is implied that gratuitous delivery of a
written assignment must fail for lack of consideration unless the gift is com-
pleted by delivery of the certificate. The implication is strengthened by the
avowed purpose of the Act to make the certificate represent the share to the
highest possible degree.17
Basing its decision on this interpretation of the Act, the Massachusetts
Supreme judicial Court recently held that a written assignment, unaccom-
panied by delivery of the certificate, is ineffective to transfer legal or equitable
title to a share.' 8 Decedent and J executed a sealed "Declaration of Trust"
acknowledging receipt of an assignment of certain shares of which decedent
was the registered owner. Decedent also executed a written instrument of
assignment to himself and J as trustees, including a power of attorney tn
have the shares transferred to the names of the trustees on the corporate
books. This instrument was retained by decedent.'0 At the time of the assign-
ment the certificates were in the possession of A, pledgee, to secure a loan.
Decedent continued to use the shares in violation of the terms of the "Declara-
tion of Trust," and subsequently pledged the certificates to B for another
personal loan. B took without notice of the assignment in trust. After
decedent's death J, as trustee, brought a bill in equity against himself as
executor of decedent's estate to have the trust declared valid and the shares
freed from the claims of B. It appeared that decedent's estate, excluding the
shares, was without sufficient assets to pay B.
In declaring the shares available for the satisfaction of the debt to B, the
court did not choose to rely upon B's position as an innocent purchaser for
value.20 The decision rests squarely upon the ground that no title to the
shares ever vested in the trustees because, under Section 10 of the Uniform
Act, the assignment was merely a promise, unenforceable for lack of con-
sideration. Under the ruling of the court, therefore, this type of transfer
would be ineffective even in the absence of defrauded creditors or innocent
purchasers. This result was actually reached in the case of Parker v. Colonial
Building-Loan Association. Decedent owned shares in defendant corpora-
tion which were pledged with defendant as security for a personal lo'm,
defendant having possession of the certificates. About to die. decedent gave
her son a written assignment of the shares. After her death he redeemed the
pledge from his own pocket and obtained the certificates from defendant. In a
suit to compel transfer of the shares on the corporate books and the issuance
16. UNIFORM STocK TRANSFER AcT § 10.
17. UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER Acr §§ 1, 4, Commissioner's Noteq, 6 U. L, A, 2, 10,
18. Johnson v. Johnson, 13 N. E. (2d) 788 (Mass. 1938).
19. J's acknowledgment of receipt, contained in the "Declaration of Trust," is the
only evidence that the instrument of assignment was ever actually delivered to hm.
Delivery of a deed of gift is essential to its validity. THORNTON, op. Cit. .supra note 1,
§ 189. But courts have gone far in presuming delivery from the circumstances surrounding
an attempted gift. Miller v. Silverman, 247 N. Y. 447, 160 N. E. 910 (1928) ; Zollieof'fer
v. Zollikoffer, 168 N. C. 326, 84 S. E. 349 (1915).
20. UNIFORM STOcK TRANSFER Acr §§4, 22; Ironside v. Levi, 278 Mass. 18, 179




of new certificates in his name, the New Jersey court relied on Section 10
of the Uniform Act and declared the attempted transfer incomplete for lack
of delivery of the certificates.21
Yet several cases upholding gifts by delivery of a written assignment with-
out delivery of the certificate have been decided in jurisdictions where the
Uniforn Act was in effect at the time of decision . 2 In these cases the Act
has been unmentioned, and the courts have nut explained their failure to
consider it. The decisions, however, cannot be regarded as strong authority
against the Massachusetts and New Jersey interpretations, for it is at least
possible that the particular shares involved were excepted from the operation
of the law because the certificates had been issued before the Act took effect,23
or because the corporation was organized under the laws of a state which
had not adopted the legislation.2 4
As between donor and donee, the rigid requirement of delivery which the
Act purports to impose seems totally unjustified. The legislation presumably
was designed more to afford a means of settling disputes between transferees
claiming under the same transferor of title than to control the relations
between a transferor and his immediate transferee. The validity of an assign-
ment should not be affected merel
, 
because the assignor may, by virtue of
his possession of the certificate, deal with third parties as the owner of the
shares. If a third party actually does take the certificate from the donor for
value and without notice, he is adequately protected against the gratuitous
assignee by Section 4 of the Uniform Act. Nor is the doctrine of the principal
case necessary to protect the assignor's creditors against fraudulent transfer.25
When such equities are absent delivery of the assignment should render the
gift complete and enforceable against the donor or his estate. The ritualistic
function of delivery-which requires proof of an act by the donor indicating
that he contemplated an operative transaction-is as well performed by the
transfer of a written assignment as by the transfer of the certificate.20 To
the average layman execution of any "legal" paper is a solemn act, deliberately
undertaken in the belief that it accomplishes his purpose. And the evidentiary
function of proving donative intent is perhaps carried out more adequately
by writing and delivering an assignment than by signing and transferring
the certificate.27 Moreover the Uniform Act itself implies an escape from the
21. 111 N. J. Eq. 49, 161 Atl. 353 (Ch. 1932). No intervening rights of creditur
are mentioned in the report.
22. Harris v. Harris, 222 Ill. App. 164 (1921); fatter of Cohn, 187 App. Div. 392,
176 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1919); 'atter of Valentine, 122 Misc. 48(, 204 X. Y.
Supp. 284 (Surr. Ct. 1924). THE UmNFoR.t Sroc TRA.srmt Acr was enacted in
Illinois in 1917 [I.. REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 3?, §§416-439], and in
New York in 1913. N. Y. Pziis. PRop. LAw, c. 42, §§ 162-185.
23. U-nioini STocic TRANSFm Acr § 23.
24. Ux-IFoR,, SToc, TRANSFER Acr § 22.
25. UxNIFORM£ FRAUDULENT CON-VEYAN.,CE Act §§ 3, 4, 5.
26. See Mechem, mtpra note 3, at 586.
27. The Uniform Act expressly provides that delivery of an unindorsed certificate
with intent to transfer the share imposes on the transferor a specifically enforceable
obligation to indorse the certificate. U.IroR.i Srocy Trm.srrm AcT § 9. But possession
of an unindorsed certificate in another's name is highly equivocal from an evidentiary
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construction used by the Massachusetts and New Jersey courts. "Title" as
used in Section 1 is defined by Section 22 as "legal title" not including "a
merely equitable or beneficial ownership or interest." And it is upon transfers
of legal title alone that the Act places restrictions. It might be plausibly
argued, therefore, reverting to the theory of Grymes v. Hone,21 that a
gratuitous assignment is an enforceable gift of equitable ownership to which
the requirement of delivery of the certificate does not apply.29 Otherwise, the
rule of the principal case replaces well established and flexible doctrine with
a rigid and artificial requirement of doubtful practical justification.
The opinion in the principal case ignored the fact that the assignor was
himself one of the trustees to whom the shares were assigned. It is conven-
tional doctrine that an owner of shares may make himself trustee for another
by oral or written declaration of trust, without delivery of the certificates.3 0
There is, however, a complete lack of authority on the necessity of delivery
of the res where the settlor is one of two or more co-trustees. A somewhat
analogous situation is presented when a gratuitous transfer to "donor and
donee or survivor" is attempted, and delivery does not seem to be required.3 1
To require delivery of the certificate to the co-trustee seems unjustified. The
ritualistic function is adequately performed by the donor's execution of the
trust deed and the assignment, while the co-trustee's acknowledgment is
evidence of his receipt of the assignment and his acceptance of the trust.
Thereafter the retention of the assignment, the trust instrument, or the cer-
tificate by one trustee or the other should be of no moment.
ARTHtUR R. CURTISt
RIGHT or EMPLOYEE TO PAYMENT OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AWARD
PENDING APPEAL BY EMPLOYER *
AN EMPLOYEE in the state of Washington was injured in the course of his
employment. Six years later, after lengthy litigation,' he was awarded com-
point of view. Cf. Heyer v. Sullivan, 88 N. J. Eq. 165, 102 Atl. 248 (Ch. 1917) ;
Hudson Trust Co. v. Murphy, 178 Atl. 366 (N. 3. Ch. 1935). And it would seem that
a certificate indorsed in blank is also poorer evidence of donative intent than the plain
words of conveyance in a written assignment. Cf. In re Brueck's Estate, 122 N. J. Eq.
329, 194 Atl. 60 (Prerog. Ct. 1937).
28. 49 N. Y. 17 (1872).
29. See Mechem, supra note 4, at 29.
30. 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 142(b), 148; RESTATE-MEm, TRuSTS (1935)
§§ 18, 28.
31. Breitenbach v. Schoen, 183 Wis. 589, 198 N. W. 622 (1924) ; cf. In rc Hutchison's
Estate, 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N. E. 687 (1929) ; Gould v. Logan, 198 Iowa 935, 200 N. W.
490 (1924). But cf. In re Staver's Estate, 218 Wis. 114, 260 N. W. 655 (1935).
tSecond Year Class, Yale Law School.
* State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger, 82 P. (2d) 865 (Wash. 1938).
1. For details of the seemingly interminable battle of the parties before the Work-
men's Compensation Commission, the Joint Board of the Department of Labor, and the
state Superior Court, see, in addition to the instant case, Crabh v. Department of Labor
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pensation for permanent partial disability by the Supervisor of Industrial
Insurance. His employer, after an unsuccessful appeal to the joint board
of the Department of Labor, asked the Superior Court to review the award.
While this appeal was pending, the employee requested the Supervisor to
take the necessary steps in order that he might receive payment. This request
was refused on the ground that the appeal prevented the department from
taking any further action before final determination of the case by the court.
The employee then sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of
the state to require the Supervisor to certify the award to the State Auditor
in order that payment might be made accordingly. The court, with three
judges vigorously dissenting, granted the writ in reliance on an express pro-
vision in the state Workmen's Compensation Act to the effect that no appeal
shall operate as a stay.2
As distinguished from the early state of the law, an appeal in ordinary
civil cases does not of itself operate as a supersedeas.a Today the availability
of-a stay is almost entirely regulated by statutes, most of which provide that
an appellant can claim a stay only if he furnishes a bond for the protection
of -the appellee.4 In workmen's compensation cases the employer has no privi-
lege of appeal unless it has been specifically granted by the Act.5 Whether
an employer, if permitted to appeal, may also have execution of tie award
stayed during the pendency of the appeal, will likewise depend on the provi-
sions of the workmen's compensation statute." Appraisal of these provisions
and their application to fact set-ups typified by the instant case involves a
reconciliation of the competing interests of the injured employee, his em-
ployer, and the state insurance fund, if any.
The.-mployee's interest is particularly acute. Legislation may assure him
eventual compensation when he sustains injuries in the course of his employ-
and Industries, 186 Wash. 505, 58 P. (2d) 1025 (1936) ; State cx rel. Crabb v. Olinger,
191 Wash. 534, 71 P. (2d) 545 (1937).
2. State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger, 82 P. (2d) 865 (W'ash. 1938).
3. Cf. Helms Groover & Dubber Co. v. Copenhagen, 93 Ore. 410, 177 Pac. 935
(1919).
4. E.g., N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 573, 593; see collection in 4 C. J. S. § 626.
5. Lyons v. Industrial Comm., 42 Ohio App. 132, 1,0 N. E. 273 (1931). Unless
an appeal is granted to the employer by statute, the question of whether the enforcement
of the commission's award shall be stayed can only arise if the employer enforces judicial
review by injunction or ccrtiorari. Such a review would go to the "jurisdictional facts.'
i.e., the question of whether the commission acted without jurisdiction by rendering a
decision outside the scope of its powers. See cases cited in footnote 10 of .Mr. Justice
Brandeis' dissent in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, at 75 (1932).
6. The legislature is free to prescribe terms upon which the privilege of a stay
may be granted. United States v. Berg, 202 Cal. 10, 258 Pac. 942 (1927). Tie dissent-
ing judges in the principal case argued that an appeal must necessarily cause a stay
because it ousts the department of jurisdiction and thus prevents it from paying the
award. But this statement is true only to the extent that the commission by reason of
the appeal has lost the power to continue proceedings for a change of the award made.
Beronio v. Industrial Accident Comm., 86 Cal. App. 58, 260 Pac. 1104 (1927); Scruggs
Bros. & Bill Garage v. State Ind. Comm., 94 Okla. 187, 221 Pac. 470 (1923) and the
other cases cited by the dissenting judge in support of his assertion. Noe of these cases
holds that a decision once rendered loses its force by reason of an appeal.
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ment,7 but serious consequences may result if payment is not speedily made.
Deprived of his wages and probably lacking a reserve of savings, the worker
often will find it difficult to survive during the pendency of a protracted liti-
gation. Unemployment compensation will be denied him in most states
because he lacks the physical ability to work.-, Relief benefits, paltry a, they
are, can at most be stretched to yield a bare subsistence; they will certainly
not cover unforeseen needs nor will they stave off law suits and attachment
proceedings upon failure to meet maturing obligations. These hardships.
unavoidable to some extent under even the most efficient type of adminis-
tration, are considerably intensified when an employer takes an appeal from
a decision of a workmen's compensation tribunal. 10 Realization of the plight
of the injured employee in this situation has prompted the enactment of
various palliatives. Cases arising under the act are often given preference
over ordinary actions." Some statutes provide for immediate enforcement
of the uncontested part of an award.12 Other statutes penalize an unsuccess-
fully appealing employer by taxing costs against him' 3 or by increasing the
award by a stated percentage.1 4 Helpful though some of these provisions
may be, however, they do not usually tide the injured employee over the
interim period when his employer does appeal. Measured by the employee's
interest alone, an award should therefore be paid immediately after a decision
by the workmen's compensation tribunal. But there is always the possibility
that if the award in favor of the injured employee is subsequently reversed
on appeal, the funds already paid him will later be uncollectible. In calculat-
ing the probability of this chance so embarrassing employer and fund as to
warrant an absolute prohibition of payment before the appeal has finally been
7. For general treatments of the aims of workmen's compensation legislation,
see DODD, ADmINISTRATION OF 'WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1936) 1-52; ScimrinLn,
THE LAW OF WORK1EFN'S COMPENSATION (2d ed. 1932) §§l, 2.
8. For typical provisions, see, OHIO G_.. CODE A.,. (Page, 1937) § 1345-6; WA51n.
REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, Supp. 1938) §9998-104; W. VA. Con ANN. (Miehie,
1937) § 2366(75).
9. The average amount of direct relief benefits per month paid to families lie- be.
tween $30.00 and $40.00. The payments made to single persons range in the larger citie
from $8.94 to $25.46. Clague, The Relationship between Unemployment Compensation
and Relief from a National Point of View (June 1938) 1 SOCIAL SECURITY BVLLITIN
7, 17.
10. The statistics reprinted in DODD, op. cit. supra note 7, at 392, illustrate the long
period between the occurrence of the accident and the final determination of the claim
on appeal.
11. For typical provisions, see the following statutes: CoLo. ANN. STAT, (Mill,
1930) § 8180; MD. CODE PvB. LOCAL LAWS (Flack, Supp. 1935) art. 101, § 56; N, Y.
"ORK MN'S COMPENSATIOx LAW § 23; PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 77, § 002:
Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) § 124-114.
12. See, e.g., CoNN. GE-. STAT. (1930) § 5252; N. Y. WORKIZnEN'S COMrENSATIMN
LAW § 23.
13. MASS. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 152, § 10; Onio GEN. Coot: A,.,
(Page, 1937) § 1465-90; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) § 2545 (3). Penalties itil
posed only on employers have been held to be constitutional. Mohammed Ahmed's Ca'e,
278 Mass. 180, 179 N. E. 684, 79 A. L. R. 678, 683 (1932).
14. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 40-1512; ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, Supp.
1938) c. 48, § 156 (k); N. Y. WoRKEx's CoMPENsATioN, LAW § 23.
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decided, perhaps the most important factor to be considered is whether the
employer is personally liable for the payment of compensation or whether
liability was assumed by the state in:urance fund.
The employer makes out his strongest case when, under local statute, he is
directly liable to the employee and has a right to appeal from a decision of
the workmen's compensation tribunal.' 5 This situation is likely to exist when-
ever the employer is a self-insurer,' or where he has taken out insurance
with a privately owned casualty insurance company1 7 or with a competitive
state fund which merely performs the functions of an ordinary insuranc-
company.' 8 This type of employer seems to occupy a position no different
from any party who has suffered a judgment for money damages: he is
entitled to a stay of execution of the award or judgment rendered against
him in order to be protected against the contingency that payment made in
accordance with an erroneous decision might not later be recoverable. The
most that can then be demanded of an employer, and its importance is not
to be underestimated, is that he furnish a supersedeas bond similar to those
in ordinary civil cases.'" The employee would then be protected against a
change in the financial conditions of the appealing employer during the
pendency of the appeal.
2 0
But the employer's interest is by no means so clear if he has been relieved
from personal liability by contributing to a state insurance fund which as-
sumes complete responsibility for the payment of compensation.2 ' If assess-
15. For a summary of the variations among state systems, see DoDa, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 513, et seq.
16. Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Yorl:,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Utah.
17. Ibid.
18. COLO. Axx. STAT. (Mills, 1930) §8177; IDAno CoDE AX.. (1Q32) §43-1469;
AMicir. Comp. LAws (1929) § 8451. Those states having competitive state insurance funds
which assume liability for the payment of compensation usually provide for an appeal by
the employer.
19. This is the rule in many states, among them N'ew York [N. Y. AVoRtnME..'s
COmPENsATIOx LAW § 23] and Oklahoma [OrrL,. ST.T. (Harlov, 1931) § 13363]. Kota
v. Standard Steel Car Co., 76 Ind. App. 667, 132 N. E. 697 (1921) ; cf. Giertz v. Snyder,
302 Ill. 618, 135 N. E. 57 (1922); Nierman v. Industrial Comm., 329 Ill. 623, 161 X. E.
115 (1928); Paul v. Skelly Oil Co., 134 Kans. 636, 7 P. (2d) 73 (1932); Carlson Y.
American Fid. Co., 149 Minn. 1114, 182 N. Wr. 985 (1921). A private insurance com-
pany must also furnish a bond, but no bond will be required if the commission repre-
senting the state fund appeals. 'Miller -. State Industrial Acc. Comm., 84 Ore. 507, 159
Pac. 1150 (1916); Enneberg v. State Industrial Acc. Comm., % Ore. 436, 167 Pac. 310
(1917).
20. Some statutes provide that in workmen's compensation cases no appeal bond
shall be required. Unfortunately. such provisions necessitated the result that a stay may
ensue even in absence of a supersdeas bond. City of Macon v. Whittington, 170 Ga. 612,
154 S. E. 139 (1930); Craver v. Gillespie, 148 La. 182, 86 So. 730 (1920).
21. Such assumption of liability will be found in all jurisdictions with monopolistic
state funds and two jurisdictions with competitive state funds. XEv. Co,it. Ltws (Hill-
yer, 1929) § 2680; N. D. Com-P. L.ws Axy. (Supp. 1925) § 396, a, 9; OHio GEN. CODE
Axx. (Page, 1937) § 1465-70; OMa. CODE AXN.. (Supp. 1935) § 49-1814; Powao Rico
L.Aws (1935) p. 252, § 20; VAsH. REv. STAT. Ax. (Remington, 1932) § 7673; W. VA.
CODE A.Nx,-. ('Michie, 1937) § 2516; Wyo. REV. ST.AT. A'xx. (Courtright, 1931) § 124-
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ments against the employer are not correlated with his accident experience,
then he has no reason to appeal at all, because he suffers no direct loss.2
Nor is there ground for allowing him an appeal because of any interest, as a
contributor to a trust fund, in preventing unlawful payments. - 3 True, work-
men's compensation funds may be regarded as a trust in the sense that the
state is duty bound to use the money solely for the payment of compensa-
tion.24 But the employer's contribution may better be regarded as an occupa-
tion or license tax on the privilege of engaging in a business subject to the
hazard of industrial accidents. 25 The employer-contributor then has no more
legal interest to contest any specific payment than has an employer who pays
excise taxes for unemployment compensation. Otherwise, any contributir
could challenge payments to any injured employees, even though they are
not employed by him.
20
If the compensation fund is administered according to the so-called experi-
ence rating system,27 the employer will naturally desire to minimize the
number of accidents for which he is to be deemed responsible. Although he
could be absolved of responsibility by resisting an action brought by the state
for the assessments made against him.2 8 a less cumbersome system has been
to grant him, as a matter of grace, the privilege of appealing. 29 But preser-
102; N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIoN LAW § 53; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930)
tit. 77, § 361.
22. State ex rel. Craig v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 53 N. D. 649, 207 N.
WV. 555 (196); Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 108 Ohio St. 185, 140 N. E.
684 (1923). The clause of the Ohio law unconditionally prohibiting an appeal by the
employer has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Ohio v. Chattanooga
Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U. S. 439 (1933). Oregon also does not provide for an appeal
by the employer. ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) § 49-1843.
23. Cf. In re Winborne, 34 Wyo. 349, 354, 244 Pac. 135, 137 (1926), (1934) 47 HARV
L. REv. 888. This view is related to the conception that the state insurance fund is just
another insurance carrier. .Cf. Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 Pac.
398 (1915). This latter view underlies the dissent of Chief Justice Steinert in the prin-
cipal case [82 P. (2d) 865, 878], and the opinion in Mud Bay Logging Co. v. Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries, 193 Wash. 275, 75 P. (2d) 579 (1938).
24. The instant case, State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger, 82 P. (2d) 865, 870 (Wash,
1938), expresses this view with great frankness.
25. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219 (1917); State ex rd. Wil-
liams v. Industrial Comm., 116 Ohio St. 45, 156 N. E. 101 (1927) ; State ex rel. Davis-
Smith v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156. 117 Pac. 1101 (1911). Only this view can explain the
holding that employees of employers who did not contribute to the fund may share in the
surplus of the fund. State ex rel. Rudd v. Industrial Comm., 116 Ohio St. 67, 156 N. E.
107 (1927).
26. This was pointed out in the instant case. But cf. Industrial Commission of Utah
v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 Pac. 825 (1918).
27. Experience rating systems are provided for in N. D. Co.ui'. LAWS ANN. (Supp.
1925) § 396, a, 7; OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1937) §1465-54, 4; ORE. Como ANN.
(Supp. 1935) § 49-1825, b; WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 7676; W. VA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) § 2514; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) § 124-117.
For a discussion of the technique of the merit and experience rating system, see BLAN"
CHARD, LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION INSURANCE (1917) 240, 253 et seq.
-28. Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Industriat Comm., 108 Ohio St. 185, 140 N. E. 6,q (1923).
29. See dissent of Blake, J., in Mud Bay Logging Co. v. Department of Labor and
Industries, 193 Wash. 275, 288, 75 P. (2d) 579, 584 (1938).
vation of the employer's interest does not require issuance of a stay pending
determination of this appeal.30 For even if the employer later wins on appeal
and the employee is unable to repay to the fund the amount he has received,
the employer's account would not be charged, and his rating would not suf-
fer.31
Nor is it likely that the solvency of the fund itself would be seriously en-
dangered by refusal to grant a stay when an employer has appealed.3 Since
appellate courts usually recognize the peculiar familiarity of workmen's com-
pensation tribunals with the problems which come before them,33 the chances
of reversal are not particularly great.3 4 And even in the event of reversal
by an appellate court, followed by failure to recover the amount of the award
from the recipient, the danger to the fund35 can hardly be regarded as very
serious in view of the fact that the commission entrusted with administra-
tion of the fund had itself authorized the award.
Doubtless motivated by these considerations, legislatures in sonic of the
states allowing the employer to appeal have adopted either of two solutions.
In one group of states, the appellate court is given discretion to determine
whether a stay should issue.36 If the award of the commission consists in
weekly allowances which constitute the only resources of the claimant, cer-
30. Cf. Cunningham v. North Western Improv. Co., 44 Mont. 180, 119 Pac. 554
(1911).
31. State ex rel. Zone Cab Corp. v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 132 Ohio St. 437,
8 N. E. (2d) 438 (1937).
32. See KULP, CASUALTY INSURANCE (1928) 176.
33. Cf. 'McCarthy v. Sa\wyer-Goodman Co., 194 Wis. 198, 215 N. W. 824 (1927);
Milaukee Corrugating Co. v. Industrial Comm., 197 Wis. 414, 222 X. W. 251 (1928);
Brown, The Administration of Worknti's Conipensation, in UIvr.SIn" OF WISCONSI:;
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HISToRY (1933) 10 el seq.; 2 CAMPBEL, W0Ki-
wmEN's ComIPENSATiox (1935) 1393-94.
34. Judicial statistics clearly indicate that the decisions of Workmen's Compensation
Commissions are reversed ho more frequently than those of ordinary courts. See tables
in (1938) ANu.,L REPORT OF INDUSTRIAL COMr ISSIONER (N. Y. State Dep't of Labor)
69; Altmeyer, The Industrial Commission of IWisconsin, in UNIVERSTv OF WISCONsN
STVDhIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HISTORY (1932) 86 et seq. For judicial statistics
showing the disposition of ordinary civil cases on appeal, see JUDICAL STATIsTcs oF THEI
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NIFW YORK (1935) 12; HAnilms, APPE.-
LATE COURTS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE (1933) 33, 83.
35. In order to furnish another check on administration, rehearing before an admin-
istrative board must be had before resort to a court. E.g., WASn. REv. STAr. ANN.
(Remington, 1932) § 7697. During the pendency of the petition for rehearing, the award
is not enforceable. State cx rel. Crabb v. Olinger, 191 Wash. 534, 71 P. (2d) 545 (1937) ;
cf. State ex rel. Winningham v. Olinger, 190 Wash. 697, 70 P. (2d) 317 (1937). Only
in case the findings of the commission are entirely disregarded on appeal would a stay
of the awvard seem justifiable in the situation under discussion. In such a case, an appeal
would be only part of the original proceedings. Coursey v. Industrial Comm., 83 Colo.
490, 267 Pac. 202 (1928); Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Nunamaker, 267 S. W. 749
(Tex. Civ. App. 1924) ; Jasper v. Liberty fut. Ins. Co., 119 S. NV. (2d) 3M5 (Te.'. Civ.
App. 1938).
36. ARiz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckneyer, 1928) § 1407; C.- L.%rm CoDE (Deering,
1938) §5956; CoLo. Axx. STAT. (.Mills, 1930) §8182; fAsS. ANN. Laws (Lavwyer's
Co-op., 1933) c. 152, § 17.
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tainly no stay should be granted.37  In case the claimant has returned to
work, it will not'be 'necessary' to let the fund bear the risk that payments are
not later recoverable and a stay may be allowed more readily.35  The other
group of statutes solve the problem by prohibiting a stay unconditionally.
Typical of these is the Washington Act39 which was correctly applied by
the majority in the present case.40 Such a provision eliminates the element
of speculation from the proceedings. In accordance with the purpose of
workmen's compensation legislation, it gives speedy as well as certain pay-
ment to the injured employee. Vhen the statute exists, as in the instant
case, the clear-cut command of the legislature to enforce the award notwith-
standing an appeal should not be, disobeyed by the type of strained gram-
matical interpretation which characterizes the dissent.
ASSIGNMENT OF STATUTORY RIGHT oF ACTION ON LIABILITY INSURANCE
VOLUNTARILY CARRIED BY INSOLVENT TORT-FEASORS*
ATTEMPTS by injured claimants to appropriate the proceeds of liability
insurance voluntarily carried by insolvent tort-feasors, against whom judg-
ments had been secured, were unavailing at common law.' Archaic conceptual
37. Employer's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 65 Colo. 283, 176 Pac. 314 (1918).
38. Cf. John Thompson Grocery Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Colorado, 84 Colo, 542,
271 Pac. 1115 (1928). The Federal Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act (44 STAT. 1436 (1927), 33 U. S. C. § 921 (1934)] clearly expresses this by
providing that a stay will be granted only if the employer can specifically show that
irreparable damage would be caused to him unless an injunction would issue restraining
enforcement of the award. Continental Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 2 F. Supp. 459 (S. D.
Fla. 1932), rev'd on other grounds, 64 F. (2d) 802 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933); Luckenbaeh
S. S. Co. v. Norton, 21 F. Supp. 707 (E. D. Pa. 1937) ; Zeller v. Associated Indemnity
Corp., 92 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937). As to similar state statutes, Cf. Dempsey's
Case, 230 Mass. 583, 120 N. E. 75 (1918) ; see HORVITZ, PRACTICE AND PROCE)Urn VNDEaI
THE MASSACHUSETTS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1930) 139, 140.
39. WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 7697.
40. Cf. MD. CODE PUB. LOCAL LAWS (Flack, Supp. 1935) art. 101. § 5f); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 2958. This type of statute has even
been enforced in a situation where the employer, not the state, was ultimately liable for
the payment of compensation. Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 156 Md. 482, 144 Atd. 61(
(1929) ; cf. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Mayo, 168 Md. 410, 177 Atl. 910 (1935).
* Royal Indemnity Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 270 N. Y. 574, 1 N. E. (2d) 337 (1936);
Jackson v. Citizens Casualty Co., 277 N. Y. 385, 14 N. E. (2d) 437 (1938) ; Frankliln
Surety Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., N. Y. L. J., Nov. 18, 1938, p.
1691, col. 7 (Sup. Ct.).
1. For rights of injured parties on indemnity insurance contracts at common law
see VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 178; 5 JoYCE ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1918) 3527a:
6 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON IN SURANCE (2d ed. 1928) 5694-5704. 5710-5714; Laube, The Social
Vice of Accident Insurance (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 189; (1924) 24 COL. L. Rsi',
173; (1934) 28 ILL. L. REV. 688; (1917) 2 Mhxx. L. Rr'. 216.
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notions of privity2 as well as the typical "no action" clause.3 making actual
payment by the insured a condition precedent to liability on the policy,' effec-
tively immunized the insurer and frequently left the injured party remediless:P
To obviate the anomalous results and correct the patently abusive practices
resulting from such decisions,0 twenty-three states have adopted remedial
legislation 7 designed to make the benefits of such insurance inure to the pro-
tection of the injured person. Section 109 of the New York Insurance Law"
is typical. Insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured no longer releases the
insurer from the duty of paying damages for injury sustained or loss occa-
sioned during the life of the policy.9 In case judgnent against the insured
remains unsatisfied, "then an action may be maintained by the injured party
or his or her personal representative against the insurer under the terms of
the policy."3 0
2. Bain v. Atkins, 181 Mass. 240. 63 N. H. 414 I12). Attaelc% on the "ancient
citadel of privity" here had little effect. See Holmes. The . lrrantlient of the Late-
Priv,iL, reprinted in (1931) 44 H.rv. L. REv. 738.
3. "'No action shall lie against the company to recover for any loss or expense under
this policy unless it shall be brought by the assured for loss or e"lvu!e actually sus-
tained and paid in money after actual trial of the issues." Such clauses successfully
repelled all attempts by injured claimants to apply principles of suhrogatio. garnislient
or attachment. Pfeiler v. Penn Allen Portland Cement C#o,.. 241 Pa. 4t6. 87 At. 023
(1913). Insolvency did not alter the situation. Hollings v. liromi. 212 la. 504, 8 So.
792 (1919); In re Harrington Motor Co. 11928] I Ch. I5 ( C. .\.I: see Legis. 11925)
25 COL. L. REv. 661.
4. Important conceptual distinutions obtained between contract% of indemuity agaiust
loss and those indemnifying against liability. Greater immunity to the insurer from third
party suits was afforded under the former and insurance scriveners were not slow t,
take advantage of such protection. Covci ox I.NsriumcE (1920) § 1175d; Sxm,rLin,
AtTo nOLE I-stva. xcE (1929) § 796.
5. Cf. Connolly v. Bolster, 187 Mass. 266. 72 X. E. 981 l96): Ford v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 70 Wash. 266, 126 Pac. 69 (1911). See REP'onr oF THE CLo.MBIA COM-
MTTE'E TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR Ar.TOarourL Accmh\-NTi ( 19321 200-20l. A minor-
ity doctrine prevailed in a few states holding that conduct of the defense of the original
action by the insurer constituted a waiver of the "no action" clause and estopped the
company from pleading the condition precedent of payment. This position was generally
criticized. See VANCE. op. cit. supra note 1, at 685; (1917) 2 .Mix.. L. REV. 216; (19131
2 V,. L. REv. 475.
6. See. e.g., Roth v. National Automobile Mutual Casualty Co.. 202 App. Div. bfs7.
195 '. Y. Supp. 865 (lst Dep't 1922). For a collection of predatory practices Iy the
insurer see Laube, supra note 1, at 224.
7. For collection and analysis of the various types of statutes see Legis. (1933)
46 Hav. L. Ravy 1325. See also V.\XCE, op. Cit. suPra note 1, at t'86; (1934) )i I.t
L. REv. 688.
8. The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in .Merchants Mutual Automobile
Liability Ins. Co. v. Smart, 267 U. S. 126 1925).
9. In re Fay Stocking Co., 95 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 6ft, 1938); see (1934) 34
Co. L. Ray. 1365; (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 325. But cf. Gutride v. General Re-
insurance Corp., 167 Misc. 608, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 387 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
10. INEW YORK INsuRxxc LA.!w § 109. There wvas general conflict among the lower
courts on the question of the status of the injured creditor under this section. Some called
him a third party beneficiary. See Tuzinska v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Co., 241 App.
Div. 598, 599, 272 N. Y. Supp. 593, 594 (4th Dep't 1934). It is now %yell settled that
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By a narrow construction of the statutory language the New York courts
have severely curtailed the use of the prerogative created in favor of the
judgment creditor. The full implication of the restrictive rule thus promul-
gated is illustrated by a series of recent cases. In Royal Indemnity Company
v. Travelers Insurance Company" an injured employee, pursuant to Section
29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, elected to accept compensation
rather than pursue his common law right of action against the negligent
third-party tort-feasor. Upon payment of the award, by express statutory
provision, plaintiff insurer obtained an assignment of the entire cause of
action against the negligent party 12 and in that capacity immediately obtained
judgment. Upon subsequent insolvency of the judgment debtor, plaintiff
moved for judgment against the defendant insurer on a policy insuring the
judgment debtor against liability for the type of loss occasioned. The court
dismissed the complaint and held that as assignee of the cause of action
plaintiff could not claim the benefits of Section 109.13 The Court of Appeals
affirmed, two judges dissenting without opinion. A unanimous court later
reiterated this holding in Jackson v. Citicns Casualty Company. 4 Decedent's
administratrix recovered judgment against an insolvent tort-feasor and im-
mediately instituted suit against defendant insurer to recover on a policy
carried by the judgment debtor. Before trial the judgment creditor assigned
to plaintiff for valuable consideration both the perfected judgment against
the tort-feasor and the entire claim against defendant insurer. The court
denied the assignee's motion to be substituted as party plaintiff and to be
permitted to prosecute the case to judgment. A recent case in the New York
Supreme Court,' 5 presenting a fact set-up identical with the Royal Indeunnity
the injured party's right is derivative from the insured and that lie is in effect a subrogee,
subject to all valid defenses against the insured. "The effect of the statute is to give
the injured claimant a cause of action against an insurer for the same relief that would
be due to a solvent principal seeking indemnity and reimbursement after the judgment
had been satisfied." Cardozo, J., in Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 247 N. Y.
271, 275, 160 N. E. 367, 369 (1928). A distinction should be noted in cases of compul-
sory indemnity insurance required of all vehicles for hire. There the right is direct and
not derivative and not subject to defenses valid against the insured. NEW YoLK V, i=
AND TRAFFic LAw § 17. Devlin v. N. Y. Mutual Casualty Taxicab Ins. Co., 123 Misc.
785, 206 N. Y. Supp. 365 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
11. 244 App. Div. 582, 280 N. Y. Supp. 485 (1st Dep't 1935), aft'd, 270 N. Y. 574,
1 N. E. (2d) 337 (1936).
12. The statute provides that the insurer receives an assignment of the entire claim
unlimited by the amount of compensation actually paid, with adjustments in case of ver-
dict in excess of the award to be made after recovery. Lunn v. Andrews, Indtstrial
Comm'r of New York, 152 Misc. 568, 274 N. Y. Supp. 432 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Death of
the assignor does not revoke the assignment. Manufacturers Ins. Co. v. Overseas Ship-
ping Co., 130 Misc. 710, 225 N. Y. Supp. 70 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
13. Compare this result with the general holding that an employer or insurance car-
rier compelled to pay compensation to an injured employee may assign the right of action
against the negligent third party. Morris v. Standard Oil Co., 200 Cal. 210, 2.52 Pac.
605 (1926); Bernard v. Jennings, 209 Wis. 116, 244 N. W. 589 (1932).
14. 277 N. Y. 385, 14 N. E. (2d) 437 (1938).
15. Franklin Surety Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., N. Y. L. J., Nov. 18, 1938,
p. 1691, col. 7 (Sup. Ct.).
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case and reaching the same result, is indicative that the lower New York
tribunals will make no attempt to relax the restrictions which the earlier
cases established.' 6
In thus interpreting the words "injured person" to include only those
physically disabled and denying all rights of assignees and subrogees, the
courts have partially defeated the legislative endeavor to subject the liability
insurer to a duty to compensate deserving claims.' 7 Despite the express
statutory provision, insolvency of the insured mky in many instances still
release the insurer from liability on the policy. It is argued that the specific
statutory limitation of those who may exercise the privilege implies the exclu-
sion of all others and the omission of the term "assignees" implies that the
right .is to be personal and non-assignable.', The courts further justify their
position by stating that such an interpretation is consistent with a sound
public policy prohibiting the assignment of all personal injury claims.10
But contrary holdings in every jurisdiction in which the question has arisen
indicate that the highly technical New York interpretation is not compelled
by the unfortunate statutory language.20 Properly construed, it is merely
descriptive of the procedure to be followed in enforcing the right granted,
rather than a limitation on the scope of the privilege. Other courts impose
liability upon the insurer whether at the hands of the injured party, his repre-
sentatives, assignees or subrogees. Modern legislation has long since relieved
the legislature of the necessity of specifying that newly created rights shall
be assignable.2 Assignment of all such contractual rights is universally recog-
16. The same result is reahed in the joint tort-feasor cases. The insurer of one,
seeking contribution from the other, is not such an "injured person" as may tak-e ad-
vantage of Section 109. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Union Indemnity Co., 255
N. Y. 591, 175 _N. E. 326 (1931). But see Greater N. Y. Taxpayers Mutual Ins. A's'n
v. Sinram Bros., 149 fisc. 223, 275, 267 N. Y. Supp. 796, 799 (N. Y. City Ct. 1933). See
(1931) 16 CoRx. L. Q. 400.
17. See V .xcz, op. cit. supra note 1, § 178; 2 BALDWIN'S NaW YCMXo INsCMrNMzc
LAW S.RvicE (1928) 172; Chamberlain, Insurance For the Benefit of Third Persons
Under Statute (1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 84. The statutory language seems easily suscep-
tible of a more comprehensive interpretation in keeping with legislative intent. See N. Y.
GENERAL. CONsTRLcrox LAW § 25a. Cf. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. New York
Central R. R., 253 N. Y. 49, 170 N. E. 489 (1930). See (19-9) 16 Coa. L. Q. 400.
18. The courts also find it expedient to apply the familiar rule of statutory con-
struction that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. Jack-
son v% Citizens Casualty Co., 277 X. Y. 385. 14 N. E. (2d) 437 (1938); Gutride v. Gen-
eral Reinsurance Corp., 167 Misc. 608, 4 N. Y. S. (2d1 387 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
19. X. Y. Psas. PRop. L-,%\v §41 (I) (1) prohibits the transfer of personal injury
claims. Cf. General Accident, Fire & Life Ins. Co. v. Zerbe Construction Co., 269 N. Y.
227, 199 N. E. 89 (1933).
20. The .New York cases have been expressly repudiated in cases interpreting similar
statutory provisions and similar insurance policies. Home Accident Ins. Co. v. Berges,
30 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929) ; Bias v. Ohio Farmers Indemnity Co., 81 P. (2d)
1057 (Cal. 1938); Pigg v. International Indemnity Co., 86 Cal. App. 671, 261 Pac. 4S6
(1927); Roth v. General Cas. & Sur. Co., 106 N. J. Law 516, 146 Atl. 202 (1929).
Some statutes admit of no other interpretation than full assignability. See Franklin v.
Georgia Casualty Co., 225 Ala. 58, 141 So. 702 (1932) ("Right of action to injured per-
son or persons or such other party or parties in whom the right of action vests . .
21. X. Y. PEas. PRop. LAW § 41.
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nized whether created by act of the parties or by statute.22 The public policy
argument relied upon by the Court of Appeals would seem equally indefensible.
The statutory prohibition against assignment of personal injury claims 23 is
counterbalanced by the legislative proviso that a matured judgment, such as
obtained in the Jackson case, is freely transferable.24 And in the workmen's
compensation cases, though the claims were unliquidated, the legislature had
directed that assignment automatically occur. The restriction on alienation
of the right of action can serve no useful end but rather is directly contrary
to legislative intent and the obvious purpose of the enabling enactment. Im-
mediate amendment of the statute to obviate the results imposed by judicial
sanction would seem to be the only effective method of perfecting the relief
intended. 25
METHODS OF CIRCUMVENTING THE CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTS*
UNDER an archaic New York statute, the civil rights of a convict are sus-
pended during his imprisonment.' In a recent case before the New York
Surrogate Court, a prisoner whose claim against a decedent's estate had been
rejected by the executor filed objections in the accounting proceeding insti-
tuted by the executor. The latter contended that under the statute the claimant
was disabled to move for an examination by reason of his imprisonment.
However, the court, relying on the established rule that a convict may defend
an action though he may not bring one, 2 granted the claimant's motion on
the ground that the prisoner had acquired the status of a defendant, since the
accounting proceeding had been initiated by the executor.
The Surrogate's holding illustrates the tendency of modern jurisprudence
to refrain from placing unnecessary disabilities on convicts. Under the common
22. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 151; Corbin, Assignment of Contract Rights
(1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 207.
23. See note 19, supra.
24. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 41(2).
25. For attempts to keep the injured party in the action and thus secure the right
of action against the insurer see Rocklein v. American Sugar Refining Co., 222 App.
Div. 540, 226 N. Y. Supp. 375 (2d Dep't 1928); General Accident Fire & Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Zerbe Construction Co., 269 N. Y. 227, 199 N. E. 89 (1935). The practice
is generally frowned upon by the courts and the compensated party will be excluded on
motion as not being a "party in interest." Lord & Taylor v. Yale & Towne TManufac-
turing Co., 230 N. Y. 132, 129 N. E. 346 (1920). See Laube, supra note 1, at 205.
*In re Weber's Estate, 165 Misc. 815, 1 N.Y. S. (2d) 809 (Surr. Ct. 1938). The
LAW JOURNAL is indebted to Eugene If. Locke of the Second Year Class for assistance In
the preparation of this note.
1. "A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for a term less than for life
. suspends, during the term of the sentence, all the civil rights, and all private
trusts, authority, or powers of, or held by, the person sentenced." N. Y. PENAL LAW
§510. "A person sentenced to imprisonment for life is thereafter deemed civilly
dead." N. Y. PENAL LAW § 511. The original statute, which has been but slightly
modified, was passed in 1799.
2. See infra, notes 9 and 10.
[Vol. 48
1939] NOTES 913
law of ancient England, the property of a felon or traitor was forfeited, and
his civil rights suspended.3 In the absence of statute,4 this practice was never
adopted in the United States, largely because of universal legislative and
constitutional provisions against forfeitures.0 By specific enactments, convicts
are universally deprived of the right to vote or hold office. 6 And in addition,
seventeen states have enacted legislation similar to the New York statute,
providing for "civil death" of prisoners serving a life sentence, and for sus-
pension of the civil rights of prisoners serving sentences for shorter periods.T
It has been said that the "civil rights" in these statutes refer to those created
by the structure of society, but not to "natural rights." s But the varied inter-
pretation given to the disabling statutes makes it clear that this generalization
is not only fraught with cumbersome philosophic connotations, but is practi-
cally useless as a basis of prediction. Generally, a convict may not bring a
court action,0 though he may defend one brought against him,10 and may be
compelled to continue an action begun by him before his imprisonment if
the other party so desires." The statutes of most states provide that he shall
be competent to testify in any action.'- Some courts limit his power to make
contracts, since he cannot enforce them in court.'3 More often than not he
3. For discussions of the common law rule, see Avery v. Everett, 110 N. Y. 317,
18 N. E. 148 (1888); Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johns. Ch. 118 (N. Y. 1822).
4. See note to Davis v. Laning, 85 Tem. 39, 19 S. AV. 846, 18 L. R. A. 82 (1892);
also Frazer v. Fulcher, 17 Ohio 260 (1848); Bosteder v. Duling, 115 Neb. 557, ;64,
213 N. XV. 809, 812 (1927).
5. E.g., ILL. Co-xsT. art. 2, § 11; N. Y. PENAL LAW § 512.
6. E.g., Coxx. CoxsT., art. 6, § 3; ILL. AN-x. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 33,
§ 587.
7. Arizona, California, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, New York, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah have statutes similar to that cited
in note 1, supra. In addition, all but New York, Missouri, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
South Dakota expressly give the convict power to convey. Kansas adds te power to
contract. Utah enables him to sue. Of the remaining five states, Alabama, Maine, and
Rhode Island have rather strict statutes, while those of Colorado and Mississippi are
exceedingly lenient.
8. See Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 730, 139 Pac. 948, 949 (1914);
REP. Arr'Y GEN. OF N. Y. (1930) 279, 285.
9. Quick v. Western Ry. of Ala., 207 Ala. 376, 92 So. 603 (1922) ; New v. Smith,
73 Kan. 174, 84 Pac. 1030 (1906); Green v. New York, 251 App. Di%. 103, 295 'N. Y.
Supp. 672 (4th Dep't 1937). Contra: Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R. I. 590, 30 Al. 470
(1894).
10. Vercknan v. Werckman, 4 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 146 (18M) (right to defend
implied from liability to be sued) ; see Miller v. Turner, 64 X. D. 463, 467, 253 N. AN
437, 439.
11. Castera v. Superior Ct. in and for County of Los Angeles, 29 Cal. App. 694, 159
Pac. 735 (1916) ; see Bonnell v. Rome, XV. & 0. R. R., 12 Hun. 218 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1878).
12. This is a practically universal statutory provision. E.g., N. Y. PENAL L,w
§2444; see Conners Car Co. v. Bank, 124 Misc. 584, 209 N. Y. Supp. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
13. Jandro v. Jandro, 246 S. NV. 609 (Mo. App. 1923) (convict may not enter into
marriage contract); Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 139 Pac. 948 (1914)
(convict may make executory contract for attorney's services but apparently not other-
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may convey property.' 4 In California he may not inherit property ;18 and in
a few states the property of convicts sentenced to life imprisonment, and
therefore "civilly dead," is distributed to their heirs.10
Probably the most serious and most widespread disability imposed on the
convict by these statutes is the denial of judicial relief. True, while the convict
is behind bars, the running of the statute of limitations on claims of the convict
against third persons is suspended as to claims arising after his imprison-
ment,' 7 but if the claim has arisen any time before imprisonment, literal adher-
ence to the statute will bar any relief.' 8 And though the cause of action is
itself preserved, the delay may involve further handicaps by way of insolvency
or disappearance of the prospective defendant, and death or departure of
witnesses.'0 To meet such difficulties, and to relieve the prisoner's family or
creditors from the hardships entailed by the disabilities imposed on him, five
states 20 have enacted statutes providing for the appointment of an adminis-
trator or trustee to care for the prisoner's estate, prosecute his claims, and
defend suits brought against him.21 No valid reason appears why the convict
may not attain much the same result in other states by establishing a trust,
with his property and claims as the trust res. Of course, if attempted after
incarceration, the trust would be validly established only in those states where
wise) ; Stephani v. Lent, 30 Misc. 346, 63 N. Y. Supp. 471 (Sup. Ct. 1900) (convict may
make contract but may not enforce it).
14. Apparently Missouri and Rhode Island are the only states in which it is definitely
held that a convict may not convey. Williams v. Shackleford, 97 Mo. 322, 11 S. W. 222
(1888); R. I. GEN. LAws (1923) § 6355.
15. Estate of Donnelly, 125 Cal. 417, 58 Pac. 61 (1899).
16. ME. Rrv. STAT. (1930) c. 76 § 19; ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 5293;
Holmes v. King, 216 Ala. 412, 113 So. 274 (1927); see Williams v. Shackelford, 97 Mo.
322, 324, 11 S.W. 222, 223 (1888), cited supra note 14. Such a provision is no doubt
based on the logical assumption that a person sentenced to prison for life will remain
there for life; but logic here may often be at variance with the facts of modern penology.
Furthermore, a paroled prisoner, or one whose sentence is commuted, finds himself without
property at the time he needs it most. Logic has not carried the courts so far, it may
be noted, as to hold that the beneficiary of a life convict's insurance policy may collect
on it at his "civil" death. Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 131 Me. 228, 160 Atl. 777
(1932).
17. For a typical statute, see N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act, §§ 43, 60. The latter section,
pertaining to actions other than for the recovery of real property, provides that the
disability shall not add more than five years to the life of the claim.
18. N. Y. Civ. Pmac. AcT § 28, providing that the disability must be in existence
before the right of action accrues.
19. Nor does imprisonment of a mortgagor extend the time allowed for redemption
of the mortgaged premises. Grasser v. Jones, 102 Ore. 214, 201 Pac. 1069, 18 A. L, R.
531 (1921).
20. Kansas, Maine, Missouri, New York, and Rhode Island. A typical mtatute i
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) c. 62, § 2002-3. Virginia and West Virginia
have similar provisions, though they do not suspend the convict's civil rights. See note
to Haynes v. Peterson, 125 Va. 730, 100 S. E. 471, 6 A. L. R. 1459 (1919).
21. Somewhat irregular is the Rhode Island statute, in that the imprisonment must
be for more than seven years.
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the convict retains his power to convey. -2 2 The selection of a suitable bene-
ficiary presents several problems. If the convict names himself beneficiary,
he would presumably be denied access to the courts to compel an accounting
by the trustee, and he risks contravening statutes limiting or prohibiting ac-
cumulation of trust income.2 3 Selection of a trustworthy beneficiary would
lessen such a risk; and the language of the instant case would be sufficiently
broad to enable the convict to intervene in an accounting proceeding brought
by the beneficiary, at least if he retained an interest in the property by making
the trust revocable.2 4 Revocability, on the other hand, might entail difficulties
with the tax authorities.2
As to claims arising after the creation of such a trust, or after imprison-
ment in states where the convict has no power to convey, other expedients
are possible. Where the power to convey survives, the claim may either be
assigned or made the res of a separate trust. A remedy available to all
convicts is a suit in another state, when the requisite jurisdictional elements
are present. The convict, it may be argued, is disabled only in the state where
he was sentenced, for capacity to sue is a matter determined by the law of
the forum.2 6 And if convicts are also forbidden to sue by tie law of the
forum, he may contend that the disability affects only those convicts sentenced
by the courts of that state.27 Other loopholes conceivably open to the convict
22. See note 14, supra.
23. Of those states in which convicts are disabled, Alabama, Arizona, and California
have statutes limiting accumulation in various ways. 'Montana, New York, North Dakota,
and South Dakota have statutes prohibiting accumulations in a trust in which the settlor
is also beneficiary. For a typical statute, see N. Y. REAL. Prop. LAw §§ 61-63.
The convict should also beware of restrictions on trusts in which settlor and bene-
ficiary are the same. For a general discussion of capacity to establish a trust, see
1 Bora r, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 43.
24. The court seems to base its decision on the ground that the proceedings are
adversary to the convict because he may suffer loss if not allowed to protest. The
language would seem to cover any proceeding not initiated by the convict, although on
its facts the case may be narrowly limited.
25. A revocable trust executed by a convict who might have a net taxable income
in excess of $2500 should provide for payment of income taxes out of the trust income
before any payment is made to beneficiaries. Because taxes on the income from a
revocatle trust must usually be paid by the settlor, 48 STAT. 729, 26 U. S. C. § 166 (1934),
they would probably othervise be paid out of the trust estate, which is under the control
of, and therefore a part of, the property of the settlor.
26. RESTATEmET, CO.N-FLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 585, comment (a); 2 BEALE, Co.-
FLIcT OF LAWS (1st ed. 1935) 652-4, 657; see Wilson v. King, 59 Ark. 32, 26 S. W.
18 (1894). Capacity to contract is a substantive matter, to be determined by the law
of the place where the contract is made (RESTATM E.NT, § 333); therefore the convict
presumably may make contracts outside the state where he is disabled, but may not
enforce a contract made within it. Cf. Presbury v. Hull, 34 Mo. 29 (1863).
27. Panko v. Endicott Johnson Co., 24 F. Supp. 678, (N. D. N. Y. 193S) (Florida
convict may sue in New York); see Presbury v. Hull, 34 Mo. 29 (1863) (dictum that
only convicts sentenced by Missouri courts are disabled in Missouri). Professor Beate
seems to be of the contrary opinion, at least as to convicts disabled in both states. See
2 BA. E, Cor-lcr oF LAws (1st ed. 1935) 657; (1939) 6 U. OF. CH. L. R s. 283.
It may be argued that to deny the convict a hearing in any state except that which
sentenced him would be to violate the accepted principle that one jurisdiction will not
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who cannot ordinarily sue are the passage of a special enabling act by the
state legislature,2 8 or the superiority of some special statutory power, such
as that granted by the Workmen's Compensation Acts, to the statutory dis-
ability.29
None of these expedients is designed to thwart the public policy of the
states concerned. While they may in some cases be contrary to the spirit of
the original statutes, it is believed that the hardships which such laws work
on the family of the prisoner, the unnecessary handicaps which they place
on his activities, and the damage they inflict on his property, constitute penal-
ties which modern penology is reluctant to add to a convict's punishment 0
The principle they express is largely an unwarranted survival of medieval
moral and political beliefs.31 In lieu of outright repeal, the present judicial
tendency to limit the operation of these statutes is highly desirable.
enforce the penal laws of another. See Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 2(3 (1991);
STORY, CONFLICt Or LAWs (8th ed. 1883) §§ 619-25.
28. See Tomaselli v. State, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 435 (Ct. Cl. 1938), holding that the
power to sue so acquired survives despite a second conviction and sentence.
29. Highway Commission v. Industrial Accident Commission, 200 Cal. 44, 251 Pae.
808 (1926) ("Convict Road Camp Bill" established relation of master and servant between
convict and state, thus enabling suit for workmen's- compensation despite imprisonment).
But see Green v. New York, 251 App. Div. 108, 295 N. Y. Supp. 672 (4th Dep't 1037)
(statute waiving the state's tort immunity did not enable convict to sue for mistreat-
ment by prison guards). Since denial of judicial relief is the essence of the disability,
it seems unlikely that a court could be induced to appoint a guardian ad liht'm, except
perhaps where there exists a statute like ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 80, § 30,
30. The exact duration of the suspension of civil rights raises different problelm,
Despite early indications to the contrary, [see Miller v. Finkel, 1 Park Cr. R. 374
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1853)], it is now likely that the disability attaches not upon passing
of sentence but upon actual incarceration. Harmon v. Bowers, 78 Kan. 135, 96 Pac. 51,
17 L, R. A. (x.s.) 502 (1908). A pardon restores full rights [Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333 (U. S. 1867)], and a commutation, like the expiration of the original sentence,
restores the normal rights of a citizen, but not the electoral privilege or professional
standing. Murphy v. Wolfer, 127 Minn. 102, 148 N. W. 896 (1914) (and cases there
cited). The effect of a parole, or of a conditional commutation, however, varies with
the phrasing of the statutes governing these matters. Compare Application of White,
166 Misc. 481, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 582 (Ct. Cl. 1938) with Williams v. Brentis, 171 Ark.
367, 374, 284 S. W. 56, 59 (1926) ; In re Charles and Howard, 115 Kan. 323, 327, 222 Pac.
606, 608 (1924).
31. "The principles of law which this verbiage literally imports had its origin in the
fogs and fictions of feudal jurisprudence and doubtlessly has been brought forward into
modem statutes without fully realizing either the effect of its literal significance or the
extent of its infringement upon the spirit of our system of government." Harrison, C.,
in Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 730, 139 Pac. 948, 949 (1914).
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